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The Independent Counsel Statute:
Reading "Good Cause" in Light of Article II
John F. Manningt
In a thoughtful article, William Kelley emphasizes that
recent experience under the Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 19941 has cast different parts of the executive
branch into awkward litigation against one another over
sensitive matters of federal public administration.2 Most
notably, in the criminal investigation of the Lewinsky matter,
Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr and other parts of the
executive (including the Office of the President) litigated over
constitutional and common law privileges asserted on behalf of
officials close to the President.3 This of course raises a

t Professor of Law, Columbia University. I thank Bradford Clark,
William Kelley, Henry Monaghan, Gerald Neuman, Peter Strauss, and the
participants in the University of Minnesota symposium and the Legal Studies
Workshop at the University of Virginia for insightful comments and
criticisms. I also thank Adi Gldstein and Matt Solum for excellent research
assistance. The author participated in various matters relating to the
independent counsel scheme while an attorney-advisor in the Justice Dep't
from 1986 to 1988; the views reflected herein are my own.
1. Pub. L. No. 103-270, 108 Stat. 732 (1994) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 591599 (1994)).
2. See William K. Kelley, The ConstitutionalDilemma of Litigation Under
the Independent Counsel System, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1197, 1207-11 (1999).
3. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d 1073, 1075 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(refusing to recognize a "protective function" privilege under FRE 501), cert.
denied, 119 S. Ct. 461 (1998); In re Lindsey, 148 F.3d 1100, 1103-04 (D.C. Cir.
1998) (holding that attorney-client privilege does not protect communications
between President and Deputy Counsel to President on matters relating to
criminal investigation of President), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 466 (1998); In re
Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F. Supp. 2d 21, 24-30 (D.D.C. 1998) (executive
privilege ultimately does not protect communications among President and
top White House aides concerning Lewinsky and Jones matters), affd on other
grounds sub nom. In re Lindsey, 148 F.3d 1100, 1103-04 (D.C. Cir. 1998), cert.
denied, 119 S. Ct. 466 (1998). Recent newspaper accounts suggest that Judge
Starr weighed indicting Mr. Clinton before the end of his term as President.
See, e.g., Don Van Natta, Jr., Starr Weighs Plan to Indict, Thinks Clinton Can
Be Charged in Office, SACRAMENTO BEE, Jan. 31, 1999, at Al. Were such an
event ever to occur, the catalogue of intra-executive litigation presumably
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threshold question ofiusticiability; the disputants invoked "the
judicial Power" to resolve an arguably intra-mural dispute
among executive officers, all purporting to represent the
federal government. Professor Kelley, however, notes that the
Supreme Court has brushed aside such formal concerns in
cases involving at least one independent agency or officer.4 He
argues that, under those precedents, even if two or more
parties formally speak for the federal government, functional
adversity exists if one of them has statutory discretion to take
litigation positions free of outside executive control. 5
This premise, if correct (I assume arguendo that it is),
invites inquiry into how independent an independent counsel
really is. The statute tells us that the Attorney General (and
derivatively the President)6 can remove the independent
counsel only "for good cause, physical or mental disability...
or any other condition that substantially impairs the
performance of such independent counsel's duties." 7 Reading
that removal restriction in light of the Court's decisions
sustaining independent agencies (Humphrey's Executor v.
United States)s and independent prosecutors (Morrison v.
Olson),9 Professor Kelley concludes that the statute likely
authorizes the independent counsel to set his or her own
litigation positions, free of the Attorney General's or
President's control.10 Kelley laments this result. He makes a
strong case for the proposition that dividing up the executive's
litigating authority produces harmful consequences and, if
would grow to include the constitutional question whether a sitting President
has implied immunity from indictment.
4. See Kelley, supra note 2, at 1213-14; see also, e.g., United States v.
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 692-97 (1974).
5. See Kelley, supra note 2, at 1213-14. As Professor Kelley recognizes,
however, the Court's opinions have not relied on the premise that the
President lacked control over the litigation decisions of the independent
agencies who were parties to the lawsuits. For further discussion of this
point, see infra note 60.
6. If the Attorney General can remove the independent counsel for legal
disagreements, she legally exercises that authority as the agent of the
President, who supervises the Attorney General and can remove her at will.
See, e.g., Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254, 262 (1922) (noting that the
Attorney General is "the hand of the President" in fulfilling official
responsibilities).
7. 28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(1) (1994).
8. 295 U.S. 602, 619 (1935).
9. 487 U.S. 654, 685-93 (1988).
10. See Kelley, supra note 2, at 1239-40.
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anything, undermines the purposes of the independent counsel
scheme.' But he believes that we are stuck with a strong form
of independence as long as Humphrey's Executor and Morrison
remain good law.
Rather than addressing Professor Kelley's analytical
framework for resolving intra-branch justiciability, this
Comment will raise specific questions about his understanding
of the removal restriction.12 Surely he is correct in stating that
conventional indicia of statutory meaning suggest a purpose to
insulate the independent counsel, at least to some degree, from
other executive officials.' 3 And no one familiar with the
leading cases upon which Professor Kelley relies-Humphrey's
Executor and Morrison-could doubt Congress's authority to
create an independent prosecutor of sorts. Yet Professor Kelley
reads those cases for all that they are worth, rather than
asking whether a plausible alternative reading might still
accommodate presidential claims to control the litigation
judgments of federal prosecutors.' 4 In a time of growing
skepticism of the independent counsel scheme 15 and, for that
matter, of independent agencies more generally, 16 it is surely

11. See id. at 1238-39.
12. Questions about the precise scope of the removal power may have a
new immediacy. Recent news reports indicate that the Department of Justice
was poised "to begin an investigation of alleged irregularities on the part of IC
Starr and his staff concerning (1) the initial information regarding the
Lewinsky matter presented to IC Starr, (2) his seeking of permission to
investigate the information, and (3) his conduct during that investigation." In
re Madison Guaranty Savings & Loan Ass'n, 1999 WL 144597, at *1 (D.C. Cir.
Mar. 18, 1999) (No. 94-1) (per curiam).
13. See infra text accompanying notes 26-35.
14. See infra Part H.A.
15. For particularly effective criticisms of the statute's operation, see, for
example, Julie R. O'Sullivan, The Independent Counsel Statute: Bad Law, Bad
Policy, 33 AMI. CRIM. L. REV. 463 (1996); Cass R. Sunstein, Bad Incentives and
Bad Institutions,86 GEO. L.J. 2267 (1998).
16. In the age of delegation, it is widely acknowledged that reasonably
contestable legal judgments entail no small measure of policy judgment. See,
e.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837 (1984); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of the Judiciaryin Implementing
an Agency Theory of Government, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1239, 1244-45 (1989). In
light of that reality, growing numbers of scholars have come to emphasize that
significant advantages of accountability, efficiency, and coordination flow from
the centralization of public administration under a unitary executive. See,
e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary
Executive, 48 ARK. L. REV. 23, 37-47 (1994) (arguing that the founders
designed the unitary executive to promote energy, efficiency, and checks and
balances); Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the
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worth exploring whether there is room for a revisionist view of
the independent counsel's independence.
This Comment will suggest some preliminary reasons for
concluding that the "good cause" provision may authorize the
independent counsel's removal for disobeying the President's
legal directives, at least on matters of reasonably contestable
legal judgment.17 Part I will argue that the "good cause"
provision, while surely expected to give the independent
counsel some insulation from outside executive control,
nonetheless might be construed to avoid a serious
constitutional question about the President's authority to
direct the independent counsel. Part II will address the all-toofamiliar constitutional question, which is said to emanate from
those parts of Article II that vest "the executive Power" in the
President and enjoin him or her to "take Care that the Laws be
Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 93-106 (1994) (arguing that a unitary
executive promotes values of "coordination, accountability, and efficiency");
Geoffrey P. Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 41, 56 ("[Tlhere
is reason to believe that a President accountable to the entire nation is less
likely to be subject to the influence of discrete interest groups than is some
extraconstitutional institution established purportedly to check presidential
authority."); Cass R. Sunstein, Paradoxes of the Regulatory State, 57 U. CHI.
L. REV. 407, 426-28 (1990) (arguing that "independence from the President
often appears to be a mechanism for increasing [an agency's] susceptibility to
factionalism").
17. This Comment does not contend that the President would have a
serious constitutional claim to order an independent counsel, on pain of
removal, to violate a clear legal duty. In the context of issuing a mandamus
against a subordinate executive officer, the Court long ago observed that the
Constitution does not confer a dispensing power upon the chief magistrate.
See Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 613 (1838) ("To contend
that the obligation imposed on the President to see the laws faithfully
executed, implies a power to forbid their execution, is a novel construction of
the constitution, and entirely inadmissible."); id. (to recognize such authority
"would be vesting in the President a dispensing power, which has no
countenance for its support in any part of the constitution; and ... would be
clothing the President with a power entirely to control the legislation of
congress"); see also, e.g., JOSEPH STORY, A FAMILIAR EXPOSITION OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 292, at 177 (1840):
[We are not to understand, that [the Take Care] clause confers on
the President any new and substantial power to cause the laws to be
faithfully executed, by any means, which he shall see fit to adopt,
although not prescribed by the Constitution, or by the acts of
Congress. That would be to clothe him with absolute despotic power
over the lives, the property, and the rights of the whole people.
This Comment takes that premise as a starting assumption. Hence, when
referring to a subordinate executive officer's disobedience to a specific legal
directive, this Comment means only those cases involving reasonably
contestable legal judgments.
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faithfully executed." 8 Part H1A contends that while the
Court's precedents seems to bless independent federal officers,
the Court has never decisively held that Congress can insulate
such an officer from dismissal for disobeying the President's
specific legal directives. Part H.B then considers whether, as
an original matter, denying the President authority to remove
a subordinate for refusing to obey a specific legal directive
would raise a serious constitutional question. In so doing, this
Comment will not attempt to rehearse the vast textual and
historical evidence on the removal question, which others have
ably and exhaustively debated elsewhere. 19 Rather, given the
constraints of this format, it will merely ask whether anything
remains to be learned from the extraordinary debates
surrounding the First Congress's creation of the Department of
Foreign Affairs-the so-called "decision of 1789." Rather than
accepting the most prevalent viewpoints-either that the
decision of 1789 endorsed an inherent presidential removal
power 20 or that it was almost entirely inconclusive 2 1-Part H.B
will suggest that the decision convincingly demonstrated that
denying the previously discussed claim of inherent presidential
removal power raises a serious and difficult constitutional
question. That conclusion may itself offer persuasive reasons
for constitutional interpreters more than two centuries after
the fact to embrace the passive virtues of constitutional
avoidance.

18. U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 1, 3; see Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52,
117-18 (1926).
19. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural
Constitution: Unitary Executive, PluralJudiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1155
(1992); Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power
To Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994); Martin S. Flaherty, The Most
Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1787-1801 (1996); Harold J. Krent,
Executive Control over Criminal Law Enforcement: Some Lessons from
History, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 275 (1989); Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 16;
Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 COLUM. L.
REV. 1 (1993); Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Note, Hail to the Chief
Administrator: The Framersand the President'sAdministrative Powers, 102
YALE L.J. 991 (1993); Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government:
Separationof Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 596-625
(1984).
20. See, e.g., Myers, 272 U.S. at 115 ("[Madison's] arguments in support of
the President's constitutional power of removal independently of
congressional provision, and without the consent of the Senate, were
masterly, and he carried the House.").
21. See, e.g., Edward S. Corwin, Tenure of Office and the Removal Power
under the Constitution,27 COLUM. L. REv. 352, 369 (1927).
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I. THE CANON OF AVOIDANCE AND THE MEANING OF
"GOOD CAUSE"
This Part will briefly consider whether the Act's "good
cause" provision leaves room for an interpretation that avoids,
to the extent appropriate, a serious constitutional question
under Article II about the necessary degree of presidential
direction and control.2 2 Given the growing likelihood that
Congress will not renew the independent counsel statute, at
least in its present form, 23 the analysis here will not undertake
an in-depth analysis of the particular statutory scheme.
Rather, it will use the current statute to suggest a general
framework for analyzing presidential authority under statutes
that contain a "good cause" or a similar removal provision.
Geoffrey Miller has argued that phrases such as "good
cause" can be interpreted to cover an executive officer's refusal
to comply with any presidential directive 24 -an interpretation
that would avoid the need to decide the difficult Article H
question of presidential control. 25 Although I agree that one
could ultimately read "good cause" broadly enough to avoid the
Article H question, one must at least acknowledge that the
conventional indicia of statutory meaning, applied in the
absence of constitutional overtones, suggest a legislative design
to insulate the independent counsel from outside executive
22. See infra Part II.
23. See, e.g., 145 CONG. REC. S2910 (Mar. 18, 1999) (Sen. Toricelli) ("It is
now clear ... that the independent counsel law, when it expires on June 30,
1999, will not be reauthorized. There [are] ... not the votes in the Senate or
in the other body. .. ."); Independent CounselRenewal Is Unlikely; GOP,Democrats
Appear Ready To Let Law Expire, BALT. SUN., Feb. 15, 1999, at 3A; Marc Lacey &
Eric Lichbow, Independent Counsel Law Faces Reform-Or Demise, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 24, 1999, at Al; Neil Lewis, Starr To Ask Congress To End Law
That Gave Him His Job, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 1999, at Al; Julia Malone, Calls
Growing To Scrap Independent Counsel Law, ATLANTA J. & ATLANTA CONST.,
Feb. 24, 1999, at A12.
24. See Miller, supra note 16, at 86-87; see also, e.g., Lessig & Sunstein,
supra note 16, at 110-11 ("We think it would be possible to interpret the
relevant statutes as allowing a large degree of removal and supervisory power
to remain in the President ....
The statutory words might even allow
discharge of commissioners who have frequently or on important occasions
acted in ways inconsistent with the President's wishes with respect to what is
required by sound policy."); Sunstein, supra note 15, at 2274 ("It... would be
reasonable to think that the Attorney General had considerable authority to
discharge the independent counsel, and perhaps also to control the counsel's
performance.").
25. For a discussion of the canon of avoidance, see infra text
accompanying notes 37-41.
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control.2 6
First, the statute originated, in part, as a reaction to
Acting Attorney General Robert Bork's firing of Special
27
Prosecutor Archibald Cox during the Watergate investigation.
Because President Nixon had Cox fired for refusing to obey a
presidential directive concerning the conduct of the Watergate
prosecution, 28 one might plausibly infer that the independent
counsel statute was designed to prevent similar types of
interference by the President or the Attorney General in future
investigations. Second, although I am skeptical of legislative
history, 29 it may be relevant to some that the legislative
materials accompanying the law's initial adoption and periodic
renewal frequently asserted a narrow conception of the
Attorney General's power to remove or otherwise to supervise
26. Indeed, the mere designation of "independent counsel" seems
calculated to distinguish that officer from ordinary federal prosecutors, whom
Congress has expressly placed under the supervision of the Attorney General
or the President. See 28 U.S.C. § 509 (1994) (noting that with exceptions not
relevant here, "[all functions of other officers of the Department of Justice
and all functions of agencies and employees of the Department of Justice are
vested in the Attorney General"); id. § 519 ("Except as otherwise authorized
by law, the Attorney General shall supervise all litigation to which the United
States, an agency, or officer thereof is a party, and shall direct all United
States attorneys, assistant United States attorneys, and special attorneys
appointed under section 543 of this title in the discharge of their respective
duties."); id. § 541(c) ("Each United States attorney is subject to removal by
the President."); id. § 542(b) ("Each assistant United States attorney is subject
to removal by the Attorney General.").
27. See, e.g. , S. REP. No. 170, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1977) (describing
role of Watergate in creating the impetus for the independent counsel
scheme); Niles L. Gdes & Ty E. Howard, Independent Counsel Investigations,
35 AM. CRI. L. REV. 875, 877-78 (1998) (describing origins of independent
counsel scheme).
28. See, e.g., JOHN J. SIRICA, To SET THE RECORD STRAIGHT 166 (1979)
(noting that Cox was removed after refusing to comply with Nixon's order to
refrain from "further attempts by judicial process to obtain tapes, notes, or
memoranda of presidential conversations"); Julian A. Cook, III, Mend It or
End It? What To Do with the Independent Counsel Statute, 22 HARV. J. L. &
PUB. POL-r 279, 292 (1992) (describing circumstances of Cox's removal).
29. Given my previously stated skepticism regarding legislative history,
see John F. Manning, Textualism As a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L.
REV. 673 (1997), it is worth noting why I cite it here. I do so principally
because legislative history is an interpretive convention sometimes used by
others; in an effort to determine the range of acceptable interpretations,
resort to conventional tools of construction may offer helpful predictive
insights. In addition, I have argued that legislative history sometimes
persuasively describes inferences from statutory structure or independently
verifiable facts about statutory context. See id. at 731-37. In some cases, this
paper uses legislative history for that purpose.
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an independent counsel. 30
Third, several structural features of the independent
counsel scheme clearly suggest an overall purpose to limit the
Attorney General's ability to interfere with the work of
independent counsels. 1 One such provision directs the Justice
30. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 170, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 66 (1978) ("The whole
purpose of this chapter is defeated if [an independent counsel] is not
independent and does not conduct a criminal investigation and prosecution
without interference, supervision, or control by the Department of Justice.");
S. REP. No. 496, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1982) ("[W]e stress that the Attorney
General should use his removal power only in extreme, necessary cases, as
removal of [an independent counsel] could severely undermine the public
confidence in investigations of wrongdoing by public officials."); id. at 17
("This section [requiring independent counsel to follow established Justice
Department policies] should not be interpreted to mean that the failure to
follow Departmental policies would constitute grounds for removal... by the
Attorney General."). Indeed, during the 1987 reauthorization of the statute,
the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee went out of its way to disagree
with the Justice Department's broad understanding of "good cause":
[Tihe Committee is disturbed by recent policy statements by the
Department of Justice regarding its interpretation of the statute
which permits an independent counsel to be removed from office for
"good cause." Although no Attorney General has yet attempted to
remove from office an independent counsel appointed under this
statute, the Department of Justice has indicated that it believes good
cause exists for removing any independent counsel who disobeys a
lawful presidential order, even an order which seeks to compromise
the very independence of proceedings under the statute.
...This interpretation of the statute completely misconstrues
Congressional intent, which is to prevent the President's firing an
independent counsel unless he or she engages in some type of
misconduct, described by one hearing witness, Lloyd Cutler, former
counselor to President Carter, as "taking a bribe or committing an
impropriety."
S. REP. No. 123, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 12-13 (1987). The foregoing citations
do not purport to be an exhaustive account of the legislative history; rather, I
offer these examples to acknowledge that at least some key legislative actors
thought it important to deny the Attorney General the type of control
advanced by this Comment.
31. Upon superficial examination, one might also cite the influence of the
maxim ejusdem generis, which assumes that a general word draws meaning
from the specific words that accompany it. See, e.g., Norfolk & Western Ry.
Co. v. Train Dispatchers, 499 U.S. 117, 129 (1991); United States v. Fisher, 6
U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 387 (1805). The Act provides that the Attorney General
may remove an independent counsel only "for good cause, physical or mental
disability ...
or any other condition that substantially impairs the
performance of such independent counsel's duties." 28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(1)
(1994). Hence, one might infer that "good cause" refers narrowly to
circumstances that disable an independent counsel from discharging his or
her duties.
Yet that contention ultimately seems unpersuasive. If a statute bars
"dogs, cats, and other animals" from a public park the specification of certain
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Department and Attorney General to "suspend all
investigations
and
proceedings"
concerning
matters
investigated by an independent counsel. 32 Another provides
that an independent counsel "shall, except to the extent that to
do so would be inconsistent with the purposes of this chapter,
comply with the written or other established policies of the
Department of Justice."33 To specify that an independent
counsel must follow the Department's "written or other
established policies" might be taken to disclaim, by negative
implication, any additional duty to follow the Attorney
General's case-specific determinations. Finally, the removal
provision provides not only that "[an independent counsel
removed from office may obtain judicial review," but also that
"[tihe independent counsel may be reinstated or granted other
appropriate relief by the court."34 That remedy makes clear

that the "good cause" determination does not reside in the
Attorney General's sole discretion, and that the removal
restrictions aim to protect the independent counsel's tenure
and independence, and not merely his or her right to back pay
in the event of wrongful discharge. 35
Given those indicia of statutory purpose, a court might
hesitate to construe "good cause" broadly to permit removal of
animals may lend insight into the statute's purpose, shedding light on the
appropriate way to apply the open-textured phrase "other animals." David L.
Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 921, 930 (1992). With respect to the independent counsel statute's
removal provision, it would be odd to read "good cause" in light of the other
listed causes, making it into a catch-all phrase for unenumerated forms of
incapacity. For that interpretation would render superfluous another phrase
that expressly serves that function-specifically, "any other condition that
substantially impairs the performance of such independent counsel's duties."
Hence, applying ejusdem generis to construe "good cause" would violate
another settled canon-that courts should construe a statute, if possible, to
avoid rendering part of it superfluous. See, e.g., United States v. Nordic
Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 36 (1992) (applying "the settled rule that a statute
must, if possible, be construed in such fashion that every word has some
operative effect"); United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955)
(discussing the judicial "duty 'to give effect, if possible, to every clause and
word of a statute) (quoting Inhabitants of Montclair Tp. v. Ramsdell, 107
U.S. 147, 152 (1883)).
32. See 28 U.S.C. § 597(a).
33. Id. § 594(f)(1).
34. Id- § 596(c).
35. The Court's leading removal cases merely involved claims for back
pay. See Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 349-50 (1958); Humphrey's
Executor v. United States, 195 U.S. 602, 612 (1935); Myers v. United States,
272 U.S. 52, 106-07 (1926).
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an independent counsel simply for failing to comply with
presidential legal directives-even if such an interpretation
would avoid the necessity of deciding a serious and difficult
Article II question. 36 Whether a court would apply the canon of
avoidance in this context depends in part on basic questions
about the canon that can only be touched upon here. The
Court has long held that "federal statutes are to be construed
so as to avoid serious doubts as to their constitutionality, and
... when faced with such doubts the Court will first determine
whether it is fairly possible to interpret the statute in a
manner that renders it constitutionally valid."37 This approach
"not only reflects the prudential concern that constitutional

36. See infraPart II.
37. Communication Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 761 (1987); see,
e.g., Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades
Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) ("[W]here an otherwise acceptable
construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the
Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such
construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress."); Crowell v.
Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932) ("When the validity of an act of the Congress is
drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it
is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a
construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be
avoided."). Indeed, its "reluctance to decide constitutional issues is especially
great where ... they concern the relative powers of coordinate branches of
government." Public Citizen v. United States Department of Justice, 491 U.S.
440, 466 (1989); cf American Foreign Service Ass'n v. Garfinkel, 490 U.S. 153
(1989) ("Particularly where... a case implicates the fundamental relationship
between the Branches, courts should be extremely careful not to issue
unnecessary constitutional rulings."). The Court's heightened preference for
the canon of avoidance in structural cases may relate to a broader theme in
the Court's cases.
At least since the entrenchment of the modern
administrative state, the Court has often hesitated to enforce structural
constitutional commitments directly by invalidating acts of Congress. See,
e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., and Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional
Law: Clear Statement Rules As ConstitutionalLawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV.
597, 630-31 (1992); Lawrence Gene Sager, FairMeasure: The Legal Status of
Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1264 (1978).
Hence, some have argued that to compensate for the underenforcement of
structural constitutional norms, the Court uses structurally inspired canons
of interpretation as a constitutional doctrine of second best; instead of
invalidating acts of Congress, it interprets statutory phrases to promote the
values of federalism and the separation of powers. See Eskridge & Frickey,
supra, at 630-32. Without endorsing the underenforcement of structural
norms, I have elsewhere defended the practice of using structurally inspired
canons to interpret open-ended federal statutes establishing governmental
institutions. See John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial
Deference to Agency Interpretationsof Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612,
632-37 (1996).
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issues not be needlessly confronted, but also recognizes that
Congress, like th[e] Court, is bound by and swears an oath to
uphold the Constitution. 38 Hence, the Court will not conclude
that Congress "pressed ahead into dangerous constitutional
thickets in the absence of firm evidence that it courted those
perils."

39

Although the canon reflects a well-settled interpretive
practice, its precise scope has proven controversial-especially
of late. Frederic Schauer, for example, has forcefully argued
that "it is by no means clear that a strained interpretation of a
federal statute that avoids a constitutional question is any less
a judicial intrusion than the judicial invalidation on
constitutional grounds of a less strained interpretation of the
same statute."40 Consistent with such concerns, the Court has,
at times, refused to extend the canon of avoidance "'to the point

38. EdwardJ. DeBartolo Corp., 485 U.S. at 575.
39. Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 466.
40. Frederic Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 71, 74.
Citing similar concerns, moreover, Justice Kennedy once explained in a
separate opinion:
[The canon of avoidance] should not be given too broad a scope lest a
whole new range of Government action be proscribed by interpretive
shadows cast by constitutional provisions that might or might not
invalidate it. The fact that a particular application of the clear terms
of a statute might be unconstitutional does not provide us with a
justification for ignoring the plain meaning of the statute. If that
were permissible, then the power of judicial review of legislation
could be made unnecessary, for whenever the application of a statute
would have potential inconsistency with the Constitution, we could
merely opine that the statute did not cover the conduct in question
because it would be discomforting or even absurd to think that
Congress intended to act in an unconstitutional manner.
Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 481 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). For
recent scholarship questioning the canon of avoidance, see, for example,
JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE 101-05 (1997) (using
game theory to argue that the canon of avoidance may intrude more severely
on legislative choice than straightforward judicial invalidation of a statute);
Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation-In the Classroom and
Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 816 (1983) ("The practical effect of
interpreting statutes to avoid raising constitutional questions is therefore to
enlarge the already vast reach of constitutional prohibition beyond even the
most extravagant modem interpretation of the Constitution-to create a
judge-made constitutional 'penumbra' that has much the same prohibitory
effect as the judge-made (or at least judge-amplified) Constitution itself.");
Adrian Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1945, 1959-64 (1997)
(arguing that modem avoidance and severability doctrines are in tension).
The legitimacy of the Court's modem approach to avoidance is beyond the
scope of this Comment.
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of perverting the purpose of a statute.'"41 Hence, the Court
might well decline to apply the canon of avoidance to the "good
cause" provision if a broad construction would contradict the
manifest purpose of the removal restriction.
Although such considerations make the appropriateness of
avoidance a close question, a court ultimately may be justified
in applying the canon of avoidance to an open-ended "good
cause" provision. In contrast with the many provisions of the
independent counsel statute that prescribe specific and
detailed means of assuring independence from the Attorney
General, 42 the removal provisions have been Delphic from the
41. Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 515 (1964) (quoting
Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 211 (1961)); see, e.g., CFTC v. Schor,
478 U.S. 844, 841 (1986) (same); Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 742-743
(1984) (same). To be sure, the Court has not invoked that formulation since it
began to move toward textualism. See, e.g., Thomas Merrill, Textualism and
the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351, 356-63 (1994)
(describing Court's trend toward textualism). Textualism, however, does not
necessarily undermine concerns about applying the canon of avoidance to
pervert a statute's manifest purpose. Even the strictest textualist will use
statutory purpose to help clarify a vague or ambiguous text. See, e.g., Frank
H. Easterbrook, What Does Legislative History Tell Us?, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REv.
441, 443 (1990) ("Because laws themselves do not have purposes-only the
authors are sentient-it may be essential to mine the context of the utterance
out of the debates, just as we learn the limits of a holding by reading the
entire opinion."); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative
Interpretationsof Law, 1989 DuKE L.J. 511, 515:
[Ilt seems to me that the "traditional tools of statutory construction"
include not merely text and legislative history but also, quite
specifically, the consideration of policy consequences. Indeed, that
tool is so traditional that it has been enshrined in Latin: "Ratio est
legis anima; mutata legis ratione mutatur et lex." ("The reason for
the law is its soul; when the reason for the law changes, the law
changes as well.")
Although they disfavor the use of legislative history, textualists will consult a
statute's context and structure to ascertain the statutory design. See, e.g.,
Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 241 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(invoking the "fundamental principle of statutory construction (and, indeed, of
language itself) that the meaning of a word cannot be determined in isolation,
but must be drawn from the context in which it is used.") (quoting Deal v.
United States, 508 U.S. 129, 132 (1993)); United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S.
439, 449 (1988) (Scalia, J.) ("This conclusion emerges not only from the
statutory language, but also from what we have elsewhere found to be an
indicator of nonreviewability, the structure of the statutory scheme."). Hence,
even a textualist might hesitate to apply the canon of avoidance if doing so
would undermine obvious inferences from the context and structure of a
statute.
42. Consider, for example, the provision that defines the relationship
between the independent counsel and the Department of Justice:
(a) Suspension of other investigations and proceedings.-
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start. As initially enacted in 1978, the statute provided that
the Attorney General could remove an independent counsel
only for "extraordinaryimpropriety, physical disability, mental
incapacity, or any other condition that substantially impairs
the performance of such [independent counsel's] duties."43 The
statute nowhere specified what might qualify as an
"extraordinary impropriety,"
presumably
leaving
the
elaboration of that open-ended standard to case-by-case
judicial development." In 1983, Congress amended the statute
to replace "extraordinary impropriety" with the more
conventional and less strict "good cause" provision 45 -the

Whenever a matter is in the prosecutorial jurisdiction of an
independent counsel or has been accepted by an independent counsel
under section 594(e), the Department of Justice, the Attorney
General, and all other officers and employees of the Department of
Justice shall suspend all investigations and proceedings regarding
such matter, except to the extent required by section 594(d)(1), and
except insofar as such independent counsel agrees in writing that
such investigation or proceedings may be continued by the
Department of Justice.
(b) Presentation as amicus curiae permitted.-Nothing in this
chapter shall prevent the Attorney General or the Solicitor General
from making a presentation as amicus curiae to any court as to issues
of law raised by any case or proceeding in which an independent
counsel participates in an official capacity or any appeal of such a
case or proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 597 (1994).
43. Pub. L. No. 95-521, § 601, 92 Stat. 1824, 1873 (codified at 28 U.S.C.
596(a)(1) (1982)) (emphasis added).
44. In an era in which legislative history was thought to have greater
influence than it does today, even the responsible committees offered little
explanation of what might constitute an "extraordinary impropriety." The
Senate Judiciary Committee, for example, merely noted that "a certain degree
of supervision [of the independent counsel] was required," and that "the
Committee felt it appropriate that this supervision be conducted by the
Attorney General, who is a member of the executive branch of the
government." S. REP. NO. 95-170, at 73 (1978). To be sure, the committee
emphasized that it sought to deal with cases in which "the Attorney General
had a conflict of interest," and that it had provided for removal "only ... if
certain specified causes for removal exist." Id. But the committee
conspicuously omitted to elaborate on those causes. If the committee wished
to strike a "delicate balance ... between the independence and accountability
of [the independent counsel]," the resulting statute apparently left it to the
judiciary to do so on a case-by-case basis. Id- at 74.
45.
The Senate Governmental Affairs Committee suggested that
substituting "good cause" for "extraordinary impropriety" would give
additional guidance to those officials responsible for implementing the
removal provisions:
Testimony before the Oversight Committee showed that the present
standard of "extraordinary impropriety" is undefinable. Amending
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standard that remains in force today. The concept of dismissal
for cause, of course, has acquired some definition through its
application in private and, more significantly, public
employment contexts. 46 Still, one might safely assume that
"good cause" cannot be reduced to a formula of uniform and
fixed content. Rather, it is precisely the type of open-textured

the standard to allow the Attorney General to remove the
[independent counsel] "for good cause--a standard which is used for
removal of the heads of independent agencies-would allow the
Attorney General and the [reviewing] court... to have a developed
body of law to govern the standard of removal.
See S. REP. No. 496, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1982). As discussed below, the
Supreme Court has never decisively held that independent agency
administrators, subject to removal for various types of cause, are immune
from removal for disobeying the lawful directives of the President. See infra
Part H.A.
46. It is perhaps worth noting that in the civil service context (perhaps
the most appropriate model for a public officer's removal provision), "good
cause" sometimes justifies discharge for insubordination. See, e.g., Redfearn
v. Department of Labor, 58 M.S.P.R. 307, 316 (1993) ("Agency employees are
expected to respect authority and follow the orders of supervisory officials.
An employee's deliberate refusal to follow supervisory instructions constitutes
serious misconduct that cannot properly be condoned.") (citations omitted);
Thompson v. United States Postal Service, 50 M.S.P.R. 41, 46 (1991) ("The
Board has held that an employee does not have the unfettered discretion to
disobey or ignore agency orders. Moreover, employees are expected to respect
authority and to follow the orders of supervisory officials. The disobedience of
a supervisor's orders is done at the risk of being insubordinate and may be
sufficient cause for removal.") (citations omitted); Huntley v. Veterans
Administration, 18 M.S.P.R. 71, 74 (1983) ("[TIhe appellant first reargues the
merits of the first two charges and contends that the evidence does not
support a finding of insubordination because the chiefs orders conflicted with
established agency policy. Our examination of the record does not reveal
error in the presiding official's determination that the order was proper. More
importantly, regardless of the propriety of the order, the appellant was
obligated to obey it while taking whatever necessary steps he thought
appropriate to challenge its ultimate validity.") (citations omitted); cf.Elrod v.
Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 366 (1976) (plurality opinion of Brennan, J.)
("[E]mployees may always be discharged for good cause, such as
insubordination or poor job performance, when those bases in fact exist.").
Even that observation, however, would lead to circularity if one were not to
acknowledge that insubordination presupposes a refusal "to obey an
authorized order of a superior officer which the officer is entitled to have
obeyed." Phillips v. General Services Administration, 878 F.2d 370, 373 (Fed.
Cir. 1989) (emphasis added). Hence, the existence of a "good cause" provision
cannot alone establish the Attorney General's right to remove an independent
counsel for disobedience on matters of legal judgment. But see Miller, supra
note 16, at 86-87 ("These statutes can rather easily be interpreted as
including within the concept of cause the failure of an agency head to comply
with the President's instructions to take some action otherwise within his or
her statutory authority.").
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expression more typically associated with context-specific
judicial elaboration than with decisive legislative instruction. 47
Congress, in short, has consistently opted for a relatively
imprecise standard for removing an independent counsel. One
can only speculate about the reasons for that choice. If one
were disposed to consult the legislative history surrounding
the scheme's original adoption and repeated reenactment, it
would reveal not only a series of assertions about the need for
independence, but also numerous expressions of concern about
the accountability of independent counsels.4 8 Indeed, quite

47. As Max Radin once wrote, the first question in statutory
interpretation is:
Can the statutory determinable in the widest range be taken to
The more nearly
include the determinate before the court?
determinate the statute is, the easier that question will be to answer.
It is far easier to make a statute which contains large determinables
than limited ones, but if we wish to see clearly and with brief
consideration what the maximum and minimum extension is, in any
determinable, we must avoid words like "just" and "reasonable" and
"property" and similar almost indefinitely extensible terms. These
words have so little color of their own that they can be made to take
on almost any hue.
Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation,43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 883-84 (1930).
48. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1307, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1978) ("The
committee recognizes that by providing for the removal of [an independent
counsel, there is a risk of hampering the independence of [an independent
counsel]. But the committee also recognizes that there must be a way to
remove from office an individual who is not properly carrying out his
responsibilities. Accordingly, the committee has established a removal
procedure with checks upon the removal power so as not to threaten unduly
the independence of [an independent counsel]."); S. REP. No. 95-170, at 74
(1978) (referring to "the delicate balance struck by the statute between the
independence and accountability of [an independent counsel"); S. REP. No.
496, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1982) ("The Committee believes that the
statutory independence of the [independent counsel] is crucial to assure an
impartial investigation and public confidence in the prosecutor's findings and
decisions. Safeguards should, however, be built into the present law in order
to ... check against abuse of power by [an independent counsel]."). Perhaps
most significantly, when Congress last reauthorized the statute in 1994, the
Senate Governmental Affairs Committee explained:
In the 1992 and 1993 hearings, Subcommittee members also pointed
out that accountability could be further tightened if the Department
of Justice were to develop standards and procedures implementing
its statutory authority to remove an independent counsel for "good
cause." The Supreme Court identified this authority as a key
mechanism for ensuring accountability.
S. REP. No. 101, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1994). Hence, at least some
legislative deliberations recognized the importance of the independent
counsers accountability, and the crucial role that removal would play in
promoting such accountability.
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apart from any legislative history, the tension between
independence and accountability pervades the entire structure
of the scheme. 49 We will never know exactly why the removal
provision itself (as opposed to some of the legislative history)50
fails to address that tension with specificity.51 Perhaps there
was some sentiment for passing the buck to the judiciary, on
the assumption that, in particular cases, judges would strike
an appropriate balance; or perhaps Congress could not forge a
consensus on a more precise definition of the removal
standard. 52 Whatever the reason, the important fact is that
Congress did not settle upon a precise removal standard.
Max Radin once wrote that a legislature "cannot indulge
itself in using large, round, sonorous words and then complain
that courts do not treat them as precise, definite, and
unreverberant." 53 By leaving it to the courts to strike the
balance between independence and accountability in the

49. The following provisions, inter alia, appear to reflect efforts to foster
greater accountability. First, an independent counsel cannot expand the
scope of his or her jurisdiction if the Attorney General determines that there
are "no reasonable grounds" to warrant further investigation of the additional
matter. 28 U.S.C. 593(c)(2)(B). Second, either the Attorney General or the
Special Division of the D.C. Circuit must refer related matters to the
independent counsel for investigation. Id. § 594(e). Third, the statute
explicitly provides for congressional oversight of the independent counsel. See
id. § 595(a).
50. See supra note 30.
51. I have argued elsewhere that if Congress can enact a vaporous
standard (such as "good cause") and then leave it to its committees to supply
an authoritative specification of meaning, it would undermine the structural
objectives of bicameralism and presentment. See Manning, supra note 29, at
706-25. Given the detailed statements about removal in the legislative
history, it is clear that the responsible committees anticipated specific
questions about the degree to which the Attorney General should exercise
control over independent counsels. That Congress did not address that point
with specificity in the statute may suggest that it was too difficult or costly to
secure the agreement of both Houses and the President on a more precise
standard.
52. For similar speculation about the enactment of a vague term in an
agency-administered statute, see Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 864 (1984):
Perhaps [Congress] consciously desired the Administrator to strike
the balance ... thinking that those with great expertise and charged
with responsibility for administering the provision would be in a
better position to do so; perhaps it simply did not consider the
question at this level; and perhaps Congress was unable to forge a
coalition on either side of the question, and those on each side
decided to take their chances with the scheme devised by the agency.
53. Radin, supra note 47, at 884.
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context of removal, Congress appears to have provided the
judiciary with room to consider the influence of constitutional
structure. If the Court determines that denying the President
control over the independent counsel raises a serious
constitutional question,5 4 it need not and, indeed, should not
conclude that by enacting the "good cause" provision Congress
"press[ed] ahead into dangerous constitutional thickets."55
Rather, the very indeterminacy of the statutory standard
seems to invite the application of the framework of avoidance
long used by the Court-a background convention against
which, under standard premises of interpretation, Congress is
presumed to have legislated.5 6 These considerations make it at
least plausible for the judiciary to consider structural
constitutional values in determining what "good cause" means
in practice.57
54. See infra Part II.
55. Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 466.
56. See, e.g., McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, 498 U.S. 479, 496 (1991)
("Congress legislates with knowledge of our basic rules of statutory
construction."); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 699 (1980)
(finding it "not only appropriate but also realistic to presume that Congress
was familiar with... unusually important precedents" establishing rules of
construction and that Congress "expect[s] its enactment[s] to be interpreted in
conformity with them").
57. Along these lines, a broad interpretation of "good cause" would not
seem to defeat the statutory purpose to grant independent counsels some
measure of independence from the Attorney General. Service at the pleasure
of the President permits removal for any reason or no reason at all. In
contrast, even if interpreted broadly to avoid a serious constitutional question,
the "good cause" provision would require the Attorney General to establish
that an independent counsel refused to follow his or her directives, and that
the directives related to a matter of legal judgment about which reasonable
people could disagree. It presumably would be open to a court to inquire into
whether the stated reasons for dismissal were pretextual; for example, if the
Attorney General's directive reflected a sharp and unexplained departure
from established policy, it might support a finding that removal of the
independent counsel rested on reasons other than disobedience. If, moreover,
the broad interpretation of "good cause" derives from the President's duty to
"take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed," see U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3,
cl. 1, reasons such as general dissatisfaction with the course or pace of an
investigation might not suffice to establish "good cause." Most importantly,
litigation over "good cause" would require the Attorney General to articulate
reasons for dismissing an independent counsel; otherwise, a reviewing court
would have no basis for evaluating the existence of good cause. At a bare
minimum, this articulation of reasons would subject the Attorney General and
the President to political, as well as a potential judicial, checks based on the
stated grounds for removal-a consideration that Congress evidently found
important. See 28 U.S.C. 596(a)(2) ("If an independent counsel is removed
from office, the Attorney General shall promptly submit to the division of the
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II. A SERIOUS CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION?
In considering whether a narrow interpretation of "good
cause" would raise a serious constitutional question, two issues
require attention. First, do the Court's precedents approving
independent agencies and officers decisively establish that
Congress can place executive officers beyond the President's
control, on matters of legal judgment?58 Second, if not, does the
original meaning of Article H cast any useful light on the
59
appropriate degree of presidential control over such officers?

This Part examines those questions in turn.
A. THE INFLUENCE OF PRECEDENT
Because Congress chose to use a garden-variety "good
cause" provision in the independent counsel statute, the most
relevant precedents relate to independent agencies operating
under similar removal restrictions. 60 At least since the Court's
court and the Committees on the Judiciary of the Senate and the House of
Representatives a report specifying the facts found and the ultimate grounds
for such removal."). Hence, whatever the precise degree of independence the
"good cause" provision ultimately affords, it at least ensures a greater degree
of independence than the at-will removal typically associated with officers
exercising traditional prosecutorial functions.
58. See infra Part H.A.
59. See infra Part H.B.
60. To the extent that Professor Kelley argues that inter-agency
justiciability implicitly depends on the discretion of one or more parties to
take independent litigating positions, cases sustaining that type of
justiciability might be understood to acknowledge the existence of such
discretion. That conclusion, however, does not follow from the Court's
reasoning in the typical inter-agency case. The leading case, which involved a
rate making dispute between the ICC and the Army, does not rest its
justiciability determination explicitly on the independent litigating authority
of the ICC. United States v. ICC, 337 U.S. 426, 430 (1949). Rather, as
Professor Kelley acknowledges, the Court in that case reasoned that the
relevant dispute satisfied Article I requirements because private third
parties were the real parties in interest. See id.; accord, e.g., Secretary of
Agric. v. United States, 347 U.S. 645, 647 (1954) ("The Secretary of

Agriculture, acting on behalf of the affected agriculture interests, intervened
[in a proceeding involving the ICC]."). Indeed, in most inter-agency cases, the
Court does not even address justiciability. See, e.g., United States v.
Connecticut Natl Bank, 418 U.S. 656, 657 (1974); United States v. Marine
Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602, 604 (1974); Federal Maritime Bd. v.
Isbrandtsen Co., 356 U.S. 481, 483 n.2 (1958); ICC v. Jersey City, 322 U.S.
503, 507-09 (1944). It is black letter law that cases resolving jurisdictional
issues sub silentio lack precedential effect on questions of jurisdiction. See,
e.g., United States v. L.A. Tucker Truck Lines, 344 U.S. 33, 38 (1952); United
States v. More, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 159, 172 (1805) (Marshall, J.).
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), also does not resolve the
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decision in Humphrey's Executor v. United States in 1935,61 the
legal culture has assumed that Congress may insulate
independent agencies from presidential control. 62
The
removal question. In that case, the Court held that an executive privilege
dispute between the Watergate Special Prosecutor and President Nixon was
justiciable. The Court found genuine adversity based on a regulation
providing that the special prosecutor was not to be removed "except for
extraordinary improprieties... and without the President's first consulting
the Majority and the Minority Leaders and Chairmen and ranking Minority
Members of the Judiciary Committees of the Senate and House of
Representatives and ascertaining that their consensus is in accord with his
proposed action." Id. at 695 n.9 (quoting 38 Fed. Reg. 30739, as amended by
38 Fed. Reg. 32805). The Court reasoned that this removal restriction
effected an extraordinary delegation of prosecutorial authority to the special
prosecutor. See id. at 696. For two reasons, that holding has no bearing on
the appropriate interpretation of a standard "good cause" provision. First, in
concluding that the regulation effected an extraordinary delegation to the
special prosecutor, the Court emphasized that the regulation stated "that the
Special Prosecutor was not to be removed without the 'consensus' of eight
designated leaders of Congress." Id. at 696. Second, the Court did not even
address, much less sustain, the constitutionality of the regulation in question.
If Congress had attempted to enact a legislative veto analogous to that of the
Watergate regulation, such a measure surely would have violated the
constitutional separation of powers. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714,
733-34 (1986); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 958-59 (1983); Myers v. United
States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). Hence, United States v. Nixon does not establish
the constitutionality of eliminating presidential control over the legal
judgments of federal prosecutors.
61. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
62. See Miller, supra note 16, at 43 (discussing the "undoubted
integration" of independent agencies "into the national political culture").
Since the decision in Humphrey's Executor, few reported cases have addressed
the President's removal of an administrative officer. See Wiener v. United
States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958); Morgan v. TVA, 115 F.2d 990 (6th Cir. 1940);
Mackie v. Bush, 809 F. Supp. 144 (D.D.C. 1993). The rarity of such cases may
suggest that post-New Deal Presidents have largely forgone removing
independent officers who were unwilling to go. Perhaps this forbearance owes
something to the fact that Presidents have an array of effective, but less
blunt, instruments for influencing, if not controlling, the policies of
independent agencies. See Strauss, supra note 19, at 590-91 (arguing that the
President often influences an independent commission by virtue of statutory
authority to designate its chair, who exerts disproportionate influence over
the commission's policymaking and administrative functions); id. at 594
(noting that independent agencies frequently "need the goods the President
can provide: budgetary and legislative support, assistance in dealing with
other agencies, legal services, office space, and advice on national policy").
Whatever the reasons, the executive's acceptance of such agencies, however
grudging, has made their independence at least a practical and political
reality. See Miller, supra note 16, at 83-86; see also Corwin, supra note 21, at
357 (citing early twentieth-century evidence of presidential acceptance of
independent agencies).
The precise limits of Humphrey's Executor's
constitutional holding thus remain untested.
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reasoning of Humphrey's Executor surely invites that
conclusion. The Federal Trade Commission Act provided that
the President could only remove Federal Trade Commissioners63
for "inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office."
The Court held that this restriction did not violate Article H.
Perhaps more importantly, it did so while at the same time
concluding that the statute displayed a "congressional intent to
create a body of experts... which shall be independent of
executive authority, except in its selection, and free to exercise
its judgment without the leave or hindrance of any other
official or any department of the government."64 Thus, read for
all that it is worth, Humphrey's Executor would suggest that no
serious constitutional question arises from legislative efforts to
create a sphere of agency discretion beyond presidential
65
control.
As others have argued, 66 however, the Court's holding
sweeps considerably less broadly than its reasoning. 67
These observations, however, are not meant to suggest that the executive
has necessarily acquiesced in the constitutionality of independent agencies.
Professor Miller has argued that evidence of such acquiescence "is mixed, and
probably is not strong enough to support the inference that the executive
branch has forfeited its constitutional objections to [such] agencies." Miller,
supra note 16, at 85-86. That question is beyond the scope of this Comment.
63. 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1994).
64. 295 U.S. at 625-26.
65. Even taken on its own terms, however, Humphrey's Executor does not
establish that the President lacks the authority to use removal to exert
control over a subordinates legal policy judgments. Because Humphrey's
Executor involved only a request for back pay, see id. at 612, it does not
address the question whether such a subordinate has the right to seek specific
relief against removal. If violating a statutory limitation on removal does not
give rise to specific relief, that restriction does not directly interfere with the
President's authority to use removal to impose his or her policies on a
recalcitrant official.
66. See, e.g., Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 16, at 110-11; Miller, supra
note 16, at 92-95.
67. It is worth noting that the Court explicitly characterized the FTC's
functions as "quasi-legislative" and "quasi-judicial," rather than "purely
295 U.S. at 628 ("The Federal Trade Commission is an
executive."
administrative body created by Congress to carry into effect legislative
policies embodied in the statute in accordance with the legislative standard
therein prescribed, and to perform other specified duties as a legislative or as
a judicial aid."). Although an independent counsel is a purely executive
official, Humphrey's Executors taxonomy is no longer dispositive. The quasilegislative and quasi-judicial classifications, to be sure, once determined the
force of that precedent. See, e.g., Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 35356 (1958) (holding that War Claims Commissioner performing quasi-judicial
functions was not freely removable by the President); Morgan v. TVA, 115
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Franklin Roosevelt did not remove Commissioner Humphrey
on the ground that the latter refused to follow explicit
presidential directives on matters of legal judgment.6 8 Rather,
the President sought Humphrey's dismissal on the ground that
"the aims and purposes of the Administration with respect to
the work of the Commission can be carried out most effectively
with personnel of my own selection."69 Humphrey's Executor
thus did not present, and could not have resolved, the question
F.2d 990, 994 (6th Cir. 1940) ("[The TVA] is not to be aligned with the Federal
Trade Commission, the Interstate Commerce Commission, or other
administrative bodies mainly exercising clearly quasi-legislative or quasijudicial functions-it is predominantly an administrative arm of the executive
department. The rule of the Humphrey case does not apply."); William J.
Donovan & Ralstone R. Irvine, The President'sPower to Remove Members of
Administrative Agencies, 21 CORNELL L.Q. 215, 228 (1936) ("Congress may
impose reasonable limitations upon the power of the President to remove
officers who have quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial duties."). The Court,
however, has now reaffirmed Humphrey's Executor on the understanding that
many of the Commission's functions were, in substance, executive. See
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 690 n.28 (1988) ("[Ilt is hard to dispute that
the powers of the FTC at the time of Humphrey's Executor would at the
present time be considered 'executive,' at least to some degree.") (citing
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 761 n.3 (1986) (White, J., dissenting)); see
also id.at 691 (Humphrey'sExecutor is properly understood to ask "whether
the removal restrictions are of such a nature that they impede the President's
ability to perform his constitutional duty").
68. See Miller, supra note 16, at 94 ("[Ihe issue in Humphrey's Executor
was not whether the President was disabled from removing a member of the
Federal Trade Commission who had refused to comply with a presidential
directive. The President had made no allegation that Humphrey had
disobeyed any of his directives."); Strauss, supra note 19, at 611 ("Acting scant
weeks after argument, the [Humphrey's Executor] Court... found that
Congress could validly impose a 'cause' requirement on the discharge of a
Federal Trade Commissioner; given the circumstances, the Court did not have
to say what cause could be."). Although the Court subsequently applied
Humphrey's Executor to protect the tenure of a War Claims Commissioner
who performed adjudicative functions, see Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S.
349 (1958), similar considerations limit the force of that precedent:
The ground of President Eisenhower's removal of petitioner was
precisely the same as President Roosevelts removal of Humphrey.
Both Presidents desired to have Commissioners, one on the Federal
Trade Commission, the other on the War Claims Commission, "of my
own selection." They wanted these Commissioners to be their men.
The terms of removal in the two cases are identic and express the
assumption that the agencies of which the two Commissioners were
members were subject in the discharge of their duties to the control
of the Executive.
Id. at 354.
69. Humphrey's Executor, 295 U.S. at 612. Indeed, Roosevelt explicitly
"disclaim[ed] any reflection upon the commissioner personally or upon his
services." Id.
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whether the statute shielded Humphrey from removal 70for
refusing to accede to the President's specific legal directives.
Of more direct relevance, the Court's decision in Morrison
v. Olson,71 which rejected a facial attack on the
constitutionality of the independent counsel statute, did not
decisively address the meaning of the constitutional
implications of the statute's "good cause" provision.72 Olson
challenged the statute, in part, on the ground that the removal
restriction "impermissibly interferes with the President's
exercise of his constitutionally appointed functions."73 But
because the Attorney General had made no attempt to remove
the independent counsel, the Court had no occasion to
determine what "good cause" means in the context of a concrete
removal decision. Doubtless as a result of this posture, Chief
70. The Court's opinion in Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986), lends
indirect support to that conclusion. Bowsher held that Congress could not
delegate authority to the Comptroller General to prepare binding deficit
reduction figures under the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act. Reasoning that
the preparation of such figures was a form of law execution, see id. at 726-27,
the Court held that Congress could not assign that function to an officer
under its own control. See id. at 733. Importantly, the Court rested its
conclusion about congressional control on removal provisions substantially
similar to those at issue in Humphrey's Executor. Thus, by statute, Congress
had given itself power to remove the Comptroller General for "(i) permanent
disability; (ii) inefficiency, (iii) neglect of duty;, (iv) malfeasance; or (v) a felony
or conduct involving moral turpitude." 31 U.S.C. § 703(e)(1)(B) (1994).
In dissent, Justice White argued that the removal provisions did not give
Congress meaningful control over the Comptroller General.
Invoking
Humphrey's Executor, he argued that "similarly qualified grants of removal
power are generally deemed to protect the officers to whom they apply and to
establish their independence from the domination of the possessor of the
removal power." 478 U.S. at 770 (White, J., dissenting). The Bowsher Court,
however, replied that in Humphrey's Executor, "the President did not assert
that he had removed the Federal Trade Commissioner in compliance with one
of the enumerated statutory causes for removal." Id. at 729 n.8. In sharp
contrast with the reasoning of Humphrey's Executor, the Bowsher Court
further explained:
[Tihe dissent's assessment of the statute fails to recognize the
breadth of the grounds for removal. The statute permits removal for
"inefficiency," "neglect of duty," or "malfeasance." These terms are
very broad and, as interpreted by Congress, could sustain removal of
a Comptroller General for any number of actual or perceived
transgressions of the legislative will.
Id. at 729. Bowsher thus backs away from the understanding that
Humphrey's Executor established the constitutionality of a broadly conceived
removal restriction. See, e.g., Lessig & Sunstein, supranote 16, at 110-11.
71. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
72. 28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(1) (1994).
73. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 686.
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Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court confined itself to the
general observation that a valid removal restriction must
preserve the President's ability to ensure the "faithful"
execution of the laws.7 4 The opinion was deliberately vague
about precisely what that premise requires. The Chief Justice
thus wrote for the Court:
Nor do we think that the "good cause" removal provision at issue here
impermissibly burdens the President's power to control or supervise
the independent counsel, as an executive official, in the execution of
his or her duties under the Act. This is not a case in which the power
to remove an executive official has been completely stripped from the
President, thus providing no means for the President to ensure the
"faithful execution" of the laws. Rather, because the independent
counsel may be terminated for "good cause," the Executive, through
the Attorney General, retains ample authority to assure that the
counsel is competently performing his or her statutory
responsibilities in a manner that comports with the provisions of the
Act. Although we need not decide in this case exactly what is
encompassed within the term "good cause" under the Act, the
legislative history of the removal provision also makes clear that the
Attorney General may remove an independent counsel for
"misconduct." Here, as with the provision of the Act conferring the
appointment authority of the independent counsel on the special
court, the congressional determination to limit the removal power of
the Attorney General was essential, in the view of Congress, to
establish the necessary independence of the office. We do not think
that this limitation as it presently stands sufficiently deprives the
President of control over the independent counsel to interfere
impermissibly with his
constitutional obligation to ensure the faithful
75
execution of the laws.

If "good cause" extends to the presidential judgment that
an independent counsel is not acting "in a manner that
comports with the provisions of the Act,"76 it is not self-evident

why similar authority should be lacking where the prosecutor's
conduct (in the President's judgment) does not "comport[ ]
with" the provisions of the Constitution, the substantive
criminal statutes that form the basis for a prosecution, or any
other applicable source of law. If an independent counsel were
to insist upon lodging a RICO indictment that did not, in the
satisfy the
statute's "pattern"
President's judgment,
requirement,7 7 it is hardly obvious that such conduct should be
74. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 2 ('The President... shall take Care that
the Laws be faithfully executed."); see infra text accompanying notes 100-102,
117-118 (discussing the Take Care Clause).
75. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 692-93 (footnotes and citation omitted).
76. Id. at 692.
77. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §
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any less an act of faithless execution, in constitutional terms,
than a decision to disregard the operational limits of the
independent counsel statute. In light of the Court's explicit
decision "not [to] decide.., precisely what is encompassed
within the term 'good cause,'"7 8 the Court's examples of good
cause can hardly be taken as exhaustive catalogue. Rather,
consistent with the analysis outlined above,7 9 Morrison's
reasoning suggests, if anything, that the legislative purpose to
"establish the necessary independence" of independent
counsels remains subject to the President's constitutional
responsibility to ensure the faithful execution of the laws, and
that the precise relationship between the two impulses must
await future adjudication. In the end, all that definitively
emerges from the opinions such as Humphrey's Executor and
Morrison is that they have not definitively resolved the
constitutionality of a restrictive reading of "good cause."8 0
B. A SERIOUS ARTICLE ]I QUESTION
If the case law does not decisively resolve the removal
question, it remains to inquire into whether denying the
President removal authority would raise a serious question
under Article II. To undertake a full-scale inquiry into that
issue, one would have to examine a vast and often-conflicting
body of evidence relating to, among other things, the pertinent
constitutional text, pre-ratification history, and postratification practice-ground that others have extensively
covered elsewhere. 81 Rather than rehearsing that evidence, I
1961(5) (1994) (a "pattern" of racketeering activity "requires at least two acts
of racketeering activity" within a 10-year period).
78. Morrison,487 U.S. at 692.
79. See supra Part I.
80. See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 16, at 110 (MTere is no controlling
authority on how 'independent' the independent agencies and officers can
legitimately claim to be."). The Court tangentially spoke to the removal
question in Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989), which sustained
the United States Sentencing Commission's authority to promulgate binding
Sentencing Guidelines to be used in federal criminal cases. In the course of
its opinion, the Court noted that "good cause" restrictions of the kind
sustained in Morrison and Humphrey's Executor were "specifically crafted to
prevent the President from exercising 'coercive influence' over independent
agencies." 488 U.S. at 411. Because no party in Mistretta, however, raised
the question whether the "good cause" restriction unconstitutionally limited
the President's removal power, the Court had no occasion to address the scope
of the President's Article II authority.
81. See supranote 19.
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will merely suggest that in the debate over the decision of
1789, sophisticated observers far more familiar with the
relevant constitutional assumptions than we are today offered
persuasive grounds to believe that denying presidential
removal authority would at least raise a serious and difficult
constitutional question.
Before examining the assumptions of 1789, however, one
must acknowledge that the structure of modem government
frequently appears to rest upon premises very different from
those that underlay the Constitution's original design. In a
world in which administrative agencies routinely perf6rm
legislative, executive, and judicial functions, 82 and in which
83
independent agencies have long since become commonplace,
some may question the relevance of consulting eighteenthcentury attitudes about the allocation and separation of
powers. Yet, as I have argued elsewhere, 84 original structural
commitments remain at least relevant to understanding the
constitutional assumptions against which modern government
operates. The Court frequently considers evidence of original
understanding in resolving unsettled structural constitutional
questions. 85 More importantly for present purposes, the Court

also uses original structural inferences in construing the
statutes that help to organize the federal government. Where
statutes give open-ended directions about the allocation of
governmental decisionmaking authority,86 the Court has
82. See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to
Separation-of-Powers Questions-A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L.

REV. 488, 492-93 (1987) ("Virtually every part of the government Congress has
created-the Department of Agriculture as well as the Securities and
Exchange Commission--exercises all three of the governmental functions the
Constitution so carefully allocates among Congress, President, and Court.
These agencies adopt rules having the shape and impact of statutes, mold
governmental policy through enforcement decisions and other initiatives, and
decide cases in ways that determine the rights of private parties.").
83. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. As previously discussed,
despite the entrenchment of independent agencies, the precise scope of their
independence remains unsettled. See supra Part H.A.
84. This discussion draws upon a more extended analysis in Manning,
supra note 37, at 632-37.
85. See, e.g., Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 659-60 (1997); Plaut
v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 219-24 (1995); Bowsher v. Synar, 478
U.S. 714, 721-24 (1986); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 946-51 (1983).
86. For example, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) uses relatively
vague expressions such as "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law," 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1994), to define
the scope of judicial review of administrative agencies. See, e.g., Manning,
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tended to interpret those statutes to promote, rather than
undermine, the values implicit in the original structural
design.8 7 That impulse has much to commend it. To the extent
that the system of separated powers and checks and balances
was adopted in response to concerns about unchecked
governmental power,8 8 such concerns surely have no less, and
perhaps far more, purchase in a complex twentieth-century
society whose government pervades our daily lives in a way
that few could have imagined in 1789.89 Although the
structure of modern government looks very different from
Madison's day, if our written Constitution is to remain
relevant, 90 then judges should try, where possible, to shape
modern governmental
arrangements
to
reflect
the
commitments implicit in the original constitutional structure.
Turning to the merits of the removal question, it is
necessary first to say a few words about why this issue has
proven so difficult. The complexity of the removal question
supra note 37, at 635-36 (discussing open-ended language of APA); Robert L.
Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189,
1194 (1986) (noting that "regulatory legislation has been characterized by
ambiguity of intention, leaving an open field for the judiciary to assume a
substantial presence in defining the contours of administrative power").
87. See, e.g., Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 37, at 605-07, 617-19;
Manning, supra note 37, at 633-34. For example, even though the Court will
not directly enforce the nondelegation doctrine, it narrowly construes
regulatory statutes to avoid excessive delegations to agencies. See, e.g.,
Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980)
(plurality opinion) (Occupational Safety & Health Act of 1970); National Cable
Television Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336 (1974) (Independent Offices
Appropriation Act of 1952); see also Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361,
373 n.7 (1989) ("In recent years, our application of the nondelegation doctrine
principally has been limited to the interpretation of statutory texts, and, more
particularly, to giving narrow constructions to statutory delegations that
might otherwise be thought to be unconstitutional.").
88. For analysis of the separation of powers and checks and balances, see,
for example, FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 301 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961); id. No. 51, at 320-25 (James Madison).
89. See, e.g., Philip B. Kurland, The Rise and Fall of the "Doctrine"of
Separationof Powers, 85 MICH. L. REV. 592, 601 (1986) ("The doctrine has
afforded less and less adequate protection for the individual as government
has grown into the Leviathan it has become."); Martin H. Redish & Elizabeth
J. Cisar, "If Angels Were To Govern": The Need for PragmaticFormalism in
Separationof Powers Theory, 41 DUKE L.J. 449, 453 (1991) ("[Tihe separation
of powers provisions of the Constitution are tremendously important . . .
because the fears of creeping tyranny that underlie them are at least as
justified today as they were at the time the Framers established them.").
90. See Henry P. Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional
Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723, 771-72 (1988).
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doubtless arises from the fact that nothing in the Constitution,
save the Impeachment Clause, 9' speaks directly to the
removability of executive officers. Any answer to the question
of presidential removal power, therefore, inevitably depends
upon often-conflicting inferences from relatively open-textured
constitutional language. 92 As Justice Scalia recently wrote,
even Chief Justice Taft's classic opinion in Myers v. United
States,93 the leading precedent for broad presidential removal
power, only scratched the surface of the question in its seventyone page historical exposition of the meaning of Article ]1.94
The array of unanswered, and perhaps unanswerable,
questions is dizzying. To what extent does Article ][, § 1, by
vesting "the executive Power" in the President, incorporate the
traditional English conception of executive power, including
the power to remove executive officers?95 Powerful evidence
suggests that the founders consulted Blackstone's description
of the Crown's prerogatives as their starting point not only in
defining (or redefining) many of the enumerated powers in
Article H, but also in deciding which traditionally executive
powers to reallocate to Congress. 96 Yet does this suggest that

91. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
92. In his influential history of the presidency, Professor Thach wrote:
The completion of Article H of the Constitution seems, at first sight, a
logical place for an evaluation of the work of the Convention and an
interpretation of the executive established by it. A closer view
reveals the fact that such an evaluation and interpretation is hardly
possible. Rushed through in the last days of the Convention's being,
as much of it was, the executive article bristles with contentious
matter, and, until it is seen what decision is given to these
contentions, it is impossible to say just what the national executive
meant.
CHARLES C. TRACH, JR., THE CREATION OF THE PRESIDENCY 1775-1789, at 140

(1969).
93. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
94. See Antonin Scalia, Originalism:The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV.
849, 852 (1989) ("It is easy to understand why [Taft's opinion] would take
almost three years and seventy pages. As I shall later have occasion to
describe, done perfectly it might well take thirty years and 7,000 pages.")
95. Even to ask that question is to assume the answer to an extensively
debated antecedent question: whether the Vesting Clause of Article 11, § 1
does any more than designate the President as the officer who is to exercise
the specific powers enumerated in the balance of Article H. Compare, e.g.,
Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 19, at 570-81 (arguing that the Vesting
Clause grants residual executive powers to the President), with Lessig &
Sunstein, supra note 16, at 47-54 (arguing that the Vesting Clause assigned
little more than the enumerated powers).
96. See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM WINSLOW CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE
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traditional executive powers, not expressly modified or
reassigned, accrued to the President by virtue of the clause
vesting "the executive Power... in a President of the United
States"? 97 How much weight do we attach to the many
statements expressly distancing the Presidency from the
British Monarchy in the private and public deliberations on
the Constitution?98 And what do we make of the models of
executive power offered by the pre-1787 state constitutions,
which served as both positive and negative examples for those
who designed the United States Constitution?99

428 (1953); Scalia, supranote 94, at 859.
97. See Scalia, supra note 94, at 859-60:
It is apparent from all this that the traditional English
understanding of executive power, or, to be more precise, royal
prerogatives, was fairly well known to the founding generation, since
they appear repeatedly in the text of the Constitution in formulations
very similar to those found in Blackstone. It can further be argued
that when those prerogatives were to be reallocated in whole or part
to other branches of government, or were to be limited in some other
way, the Constitution generally did so expressly.
98. See, e.g., Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 16, at 13 ("It is an important
truism that the framers were quite skeptical of broad executive authority, a
notion they associated with the tyrannical power of the King."); Scalia, supra
note 94, at 858-59 ("[Ihe proponents of the Constitution during the
ratification campaign felt constrained to emphasize the important differences
between British royal prerogative and the powers of the presidency."); see
also, e.g., I MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787, at 65 (1966) ("Mr. Wilson... did not consider the Prerogatives of the
British Monarch as a proper guide in defining the Executive powers."); THE
FEDERALIST No. 67, at 408 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
("It is impossible not to bestow the imputation of deliberate imposture and
deception upon the gross pretense of a similitude between a king of Great
Britain and a magistrate of the character marked out for the President of the
United States."); 4 JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE
CONSTITUTION

CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION

107-10

(1866) (remarks of Iredell at North Carolina Convention) (distinguishing the
President from the King of Great Britain). Indeed, Corwin suggests that
English history is inapposite because the Crown's power "in the appointment
and removal of officers is an historical outgrowth of and is still intimately
involved with a much wider prerogative in the creation of offices." Corwin,
supra note 21, at 383. Hence, the source of the removal power may not
translate readily to a system in which the more basic allocation of
governmental power departs from the British model. See infra text
accompanying notes 129-130.
99. Compare, e.g., Calabresi.& Prakash, supra note 19, at 607 (arguing

that pre-ratification state constitutions adopted a strong conception of
distinctive executive and legislative powers), with Flaherty, supra note 19, at
1768-69, 1776-77 (arguing that the New York and Massachusetts
Constitutions served as models for the United States Constitution, but did not
embrace a strong version of gubernatorial control over executive officers).
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Other aspects of Article 11, not to mention Article I, only
complicate matters further. Some have argued that broad
removal authority is implicit in the President's duty to "take
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." 00 Since it is
pointless, they say, to assign the President a duty that he or
she has no authority to fulfill, ordinary rules of construction
would indicate an implied executive power to remove officers,
who, in the President's judgment, are not faithfully executing
the laws. 101 While that understanding appears to be a
reasonable implication of the Take Care Clause, it is surely not
incontestable,102 particularly when considered in conjunction
with related constitutional texts. Along these lines, critics of
broad removal power have questioned whether such a potent
implication can be reconciled with the Constitution's inclusion
of the Opinion Clause, which authorizes the President to
"require the Opinion, in writing, of the Principal Officer in each
of the executive Departments, relating to the Duties of their
respective Offices." 0 3 They maintain, in short, that it would
have made little sense for the founders to confer so trivial a
power in express terms if Article IE connoted a broad implied

Determining the appropriate role to assign to state models of constitutional
power is especially treacherous; as Gordon Wood has established, much of the
design of the Constitution reflected a reaction against the structural
arrangements of the early state governments. See GORDON WOOD, THE
CREATION OF THE AMEERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 463-67 (1969).
100. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
101. See Myers, 272 U.S. at 122 ("[Wlhen the grant of the executive power
is enforced by the express mandate to take care that the laws be faithfully
executed, it emphasizes the necessity for including within the executive power
as conferred the exclusive power of removal."); see also infra text accompanying note 118.
102. See Corwin, supra note 21, at 385 ("Nor should it be overlooked...
that the clause requiring the President to 'take care that the laws be faithfully
executed' was taken almost verbatim from the New York Constitution of 1777,
which none the less gave the executive of that state very little voice in either
appointing or removals."); see also Myers, 272 U.S. at 236 (McReynolds, J.,
dissenting):
The Constitution of New York, much copied in the federal
Constitution... defined [the Governor's] powers and duties-among
them, 'to take care that the laws are faithfully executed to the best of
his ability.' It further provided 'that the treasurer of this state shall
be appointed by act of the Legislature,' and intrusted the
appointment of civil and military officers to a council. The Governor
had no power to remove them, but apparently nobody thought he
would be unable to execute the laws through officers designated by
another.
103. U.S. CONST. art. H, § 2, ch 1.
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power to control the execution of the laws through the removal
of executive officials.104 And then there is the important
question of the Necessary and Proper Clause of Article 1,105
which some have read as broad grant of congressional
authority to determine the shape of the federal government,
including the independence vel non of federal agencies1 06
This necessarily stylized account of the major textual
issues (or, more accurately, a subset of the major textual
104. See, e.g., Myers, 272 U.S. at 207 (McReynolds, J., dissenting) ("It is
beyond the ordinary imagination to picture 40 or 50 capable men, presided
over by George Washington, vainly discussing, in the heat of a Philadelphia
summer, whether express authority to require opinions in writing should be
delegated to a President in whom they had already vested the illimitable
executive power here claimed."); Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 16, at 32
("What reason would there have been for providing the President with a
constitutional power to demand written reports from officers over whom he
already had an inherent power to control?"). In response, Calabresi and
Prakash have argued, inter alia, that "the Opinion Clause empowers the
President to obtain information on government matters precisely so he will be
able to issue binding orders to his subordinates." Calabresi & Prakash, supra
note 19, at 584. That explanation, however, does not address why the
founders thought it necessary to make explicit the power to request such
opinions. For an interesting explanation of the Opinion Clause, see Akhil
Reed Amar, Some Opinionson the Opinion Clause, 82 VA. L. REV. 647 (1996).
105. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 ("Congress shall have Power... [t]o
make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or
Officer thereof.").
106. See, e.g., Donovan & Irvine, supra note 67, at 217 ("If the functions of
[an administrative] office require the exercise of independent action, then
Congress has the express power to pass all 'necessary and proper' laws to
safeguard that independence even from the President."); Lessig & Sunstein,
supra note 16, at 67 ("In as clear a textual commitment as possible, it is
Congress that is granted the power to determine the means for specifying how
powers-and, again, all powers-in the federal government are to be
exercised."). In somewhat less sweeping terms, Peter Strauss has argued that
"[in almost all significant respects.., the job of creating and altering the
shape of the federal government was left to the future-to the congressional
processes suggested by Congress's authority [under the Necessary and Proper
Clause]." Strauss, supra note 19, at 598-99. Building on that assumption,
Justice Holmes once argued that the President's duty of faithful execution
extends to the allocations of discretion that Congress has prescribed in
creating agencies and defining their powers. See, e.g., Myers, 272 U.S. at 295
(Holmes, J., dissenting) ("The duty of the President to see that the laws be
executed is a duty that does not go beyond the laws or require him to achieve
more than Congress saw fit to leave within his power."). Professor Corwin
nicely summarized the core constitutional tension when he said that the
"confrontation ... of the 'executive' power of the President with the 'necessary
and proper' powers of Congress supplies the grand issue" of the removal
power. Corwin, supra note 21, at 359 (italics omitted).
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issues) cannot begin to capture the complexity and
sophistication of a debate that has filled thousands of pages
and spanned more than two centuries. The difficulty of
untangling the necessary textual, structural, and historical
implications two centuries after the fact surely highlights the
usual concern that with the passage of time, "[ailterations in
the legal and cultural landscape may make... meaning hard
to recover."1 07 But for reasons that soon will become apparent,
the more telling point is that skilled eighteenth century
observers, familiar with the assumptions of the day, did not
find it much easier to resolve this complex question that the
constitutional text did not explicitly address.
Evidence for this proposition lies in the debate associated
with the decision of 1789-the First Congress's debate over the
establishment of the Department of Foreign Affairs. That
debate, which spanned many days, focused on a clause in the
bill providing that the Secretary was "to be removable by the
President of the United States." 08 The deliberations gave
detailed, indeed exhaustive, consideration to the constitutional
ground rules, if any, for removing an executive officer. The
discussions produced a wide array of opinion, which Edward
Corwin accurately classified as follows:
Three fairly equal parties disclosed themselves: first, those who
believed that the power of removal was the President's alone by the
intention of the constitution; second, those who believed, on like
grounds, that it belonged to the President acting by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate; thirdly, those who held that the
Constitution had not settled the question, and that, therefore, it
remained for Congress to settle it. A fourth group, comprising
apparently only two or three members, were of opinion that
impeachment was the only constitutional method of removal. 1'

Most of the arguments were sophisticated and lawyerly,
invoking the text and structure of the Constitution, analogies
involving English and state law institutions, and the practical
consequences of choosing one interpretation over another." 0
107. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Pena, 44 F.3d 437, 445 (7th Cir. 1994)
(Easterbrook, J., concurring).
108. 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 474 (Joseph Gales & William W. Seaton eds.,
1834).
109. Corwin, supra note 21, at 361. For a substantially similar account of
the debate, see THACH, supra note 92, at 152.
110. Even the small minority who argued in favor of the exclusivity of
impeachment made plausible arguments in support of that claim. See 1
ANNALS OF CONGRESS, supra note 108, at 475 (Rep. Smith of South Carolina)
("Now, I infer... that, as the constitution has not given the President the
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Even a brief account of the major claims of the three major
subgroups-the presidential, senatorial, and congressional
parties, as Corwin once called them' 1 -will suffice to show not
only the seriousness of their engagement, but also the difficulty
of the question debated.
The presidential party, led by Madison, contended that the
President possesses inherent Article II authority to remove
subordinate executive officers.1 2 At least in the early days of
the debate, the Madisonian forces favored retaining the
statute's express removal clause as a practical exposition of the
Constitution.n1 Although many of their arguments sought to
answer the precise claim that the Constitution required the
Senate's concurrence in removal, the presidential party's
reasoning had broader implications. Referring to the Vesting
Clause of Article I, § 1, for example, Madison contended that "if
any power whatsoever is in its nature executive, it is the power
of appointing, overseeing, and controlling those who execute

power of removability, it meant that he should not have that power; and this
inference is supported by that clause in the constitution which provides that
all civil officers of the United States shall be removed by impeachment ....
Here is a particular mode described for removing;, and if there is no other
mode directed, I contend that the constitution contemplated only this mode.");
id. ("I imagine, sir, we are declaring a power in the President which may
hereafter be greatly abused; for we are not always to expect a Chief
Magistrate in whom such entire confidence can be placed as the present.").
111. See Corwin, supra note 21, at 361 n.22.
112. At first, Madison argued that the question of removal lay within the
regulatory power of Congress. See 1 ANNALs OF CONGREss, supra note 108, at
389 (Rep. Madison) (arguing that "because Congress may establish offices by
law; therefore most certainly, it is in the discretion of the Legislature to say
upon what terms the office should be held, either during good behavior or
during pleasure"). Upon further reflection, he shifted to the position that the
President possessed inherent removal authority. See id. at 480 ("I have, since
the subject was last before the House, examined the constitution with
attention, and I acknowledge that it does not perfectly correspond with the
ideas I entertained of it from the first glance.").
113. See, e.g., id. at 479 (Rep. Madison) ("Mf it is nothing more than a
mere declaration of a clear grant made by the constitution, it can do no harm;
but if it relates to a doubtful part of the constitution, I suppose an exposition
of the constitution may come with as much propriety from the Legislature, as
any other department of Government."); id. at 482 (Rep. Vining) ("The House
has determined to make a declaration of their construction on the
constitution."); id. at 488 (Rep. Boudinot) ("I am disposed to think the clause
proper; and as some doubts respecting the construction of the constitution
have arisen, I think it also necessary."); id. at 509 (Rep. Clymer) ("These being
my sentiments, I wish the clause to stand as a legislative declaration, that the
power of removal is constitutionally vested in the President.").
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the laws." 114 While acknowledging that the Constitution had
expressly qualified the appointment power by requiring the
Senate's advice and consent for principal officers, 115 Madison
argued that the separation of powers disfavored engrafting, by
implication, any unspecified qualifications upon the executive
power.1 16 An implied presidential removal power also was
114. Id. at 481; see, e.g., id. at 397 (Rep. Clymer) ("[Tihe power of removal
was an executive power, and as such belonged to the President alone, by the
express words of the Constitution: 'the executive power shall be vested in a
President of the United States of America.'); id. at 516 (Rep. Madison) ("I
agree that if nothing more was said in the constitution than that the
President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, should appoint to
office, there would be great force in saying that the power of removal resulted
by natural implication from the power of appointing. But there is another
part of the constitution, no less explicit .... [Ilt is that part which declares
that the executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States.");
id. at 548-49 (Rep. Boudinot) ("If we establish an office avowedly to aid the
President, we leave the conduct of it to his discretion. Hence the whole
executive is to be left with him. Agreeably to this maxim, all executive power
shall be vested in a President."). Representative Ames made the following
structural argument based on the Vesting Clause:
The Constitution places all the executive power in the hands of the
President, and could he personally execute all the laws, there would
be no occasion for establishing auxiliaries; but the circumscribed
powers of human nature in one man, demand the aid of others....
But in order that [the President] may have responsibility to his
country, he must have a choice in selecting his assistants, a control
over them, with power to remove them when he finds the
qualifications which induced their appointment to cease.
Id. at 492.
115. See, e.g., id. at 397 (Rep. Clymer) ("It was true, in some instances,
[the Senate] held a qualified check, but that was in consequence of an express
declaration in the constitution; without such declaration, they would not have
been called upon for advice and consent in the case of appointment."); id. at
481-82 (Rep. Madison) ("If the constitution had not qualified the power of the
President in appointing to office, by associating the Senate with him in that
business, would it not be clear by virtue of his executive power, to make such
an appointment? Should we be authorized, in defiance of that clause in the
Constitution-The executive power shall be vested in a President,' to unite
the Senate with the President in the appointment to office?").
116. Madison thus contended:
There is another great maxim which ought to direct us in
expounding the constitution.., that the three great departments of
government be kept separate and distinct; and if in any case they are
blended, it is in order to admit a partial qualification, in order more
effectually to guard against an entire consolidation. I think,
therefore, when we review the several parts of this constitution,
when it says that the legislative powers shall be vested in a Congress
of the United States under certain exceptions, and the executive
power vested in a President with certain exceptions, we must
suppose that they were intended to be kept separate in all cases in
which they are not blended ....
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deemed essential to the fulfillment of the President's
enumerated Article II powers.' 17 Madison, among others,
relied specifically upon the Take Care Clause to substantiate
that contention:
[Tihere is another part of the constitution which inclines, in my
judgment, to favor the construction I put on it; the President is
required to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. If the duty
to see the laws faithfully executed be required at the hands of the
Executive Magistrate, it would seem that it was generally intended to
have that species of power which is necessary to accomplish that end.
Now, if the officer once appointed does not depend upon the
President for his existence, but upon a distinct body ...I confess I do
not see how the President can take care that the laws be faithfully
executed. 1 8

The presidential party did not rest alone upon the text of
Article II. Its members reinforced their textual claims with a
series of structural and practical arguments.1 ' 9 For example,
some argued that recognizing presidential removal power
would ensure that executive officers were ultimately

Id. at 516-17 (Rep. Madison); accord, e.g., id. at 580 (Rep. Baldwin) ("It was
found necessary to blend powers to a certain degree; so far we must acquiesce.
The Senate must concur with the President in making appointments, but with
respect to removal they are not associated ..... ).
117. See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS 39-40 (1997).
118. 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS, supra note 108, at 516; see also, e.g., id. at
393 (Rep. Goodhue) ("It was the peculiar duty of the President to watch over
the executive officers; but of what avail would be his inspection, unless he had
a power to correct the abuses he might discover."); id. at 561 (Rep. Ames) ("In
the constitution the President is required to see the laws faithfully executed.
He cannot do this without he has a control over officers appointed to aid him
in the performance of this duty."). Representative Vining also invoked the
Take Care Clause in arguing that presidential removal power posed no threat
to liberty- "Who, let me ask, is the Chief Magistrate under this Government?
The President. What are his duties? To see the laws faithfully executed; if he
does not do this effectually, he is responsible. To whom? To the people." Id.
at 594.
119. Corwin curiously dismisses this aspect of the debate as being based
"largely or altogether on the argument from convenience." Corwin, supra note
21, at 362. If the derivation of presidential removal power from the Vesting or
the Take Care Clause was a matter of implication and conceded to be a close
and serious question, it is difficult to see why such practical arguments were
not legitimate instruments for identifying the purpose of those clauses. Even
the strictest textualist would acknowledge that purpose is relevant in
determining the meaning of a doubtful text, and that the policy consequences
of alternative interpretations illuminate purpose. In fact Corwin himself
notes that the citation of practical considerations likely was calculated to
determine "what the Constitution must have intended." Corwin, supra note
21, at 362.
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accountable to the people.1 20 Little was to be feared, moreover,
from vesting removal power in the President alone, for any
President who abused that authority could be impeached or, 12at
least, turned out at the ballot box every four years. '
Conversely, the failure to acknowledge an unfettered
presidential removal power would raise serious concerns. If
the President had to secure the advice and consent of the
Senate, it would diffuse official responsibility for retaining bad
characters in office. 2 2 And whereas the threat of removal
123
would promote an officer's vigilance to his or her public duty,

120. As Madison put it:
If the President should possess alone the power of removal from
office, those who are employed in the execution of the law will be in
their proper situation, and the chain of dependence be preserved; the
lowest officers, the middle grade, and the highest, will depend, as
they ought, on the President, and the President on the community.
The chain of dependence therefore terminates in the supreme body,
namely, in the people, who will possess, besides, in aid of their
original power, the decisive engine of impeachment.
1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS, supra note 108, at 518; see, e.g., id. at 480 (Rep.
Madison) ("It is evidently the intention of the constitution, that the first
Magistrate should be responsible for the executive department; so far
therefore as we do not make the officers who are to aid him in the duties of
that department responsible to him, he is not responsible to his country.").
121. See, e.g., id. at 480 (Rep. Madison) ("I own that I am not afraid to
place my confidence in [the President], especially when I know he is
impeachable for any crime or misdemeanor before the Senate; and that, at all
events, he is impeachable before the community at large every four years, and
liable to be displaced if his conduct shall have given umbrage during the time
he has been in office."); id. at 581 (Rep. Baldwin) (emphasizing that the
President is "subject to impeachment, and ever dependent upon the will of the
people for his re-election"); id. at 594 (Rep. Vining) ("Have [the people] the
means of calling [the President] to account, and punishing him for neglect?
They have secured it in the constitution, by impeachment, to be presented to
their immediate representatives; if they fail here, they have another check
when the time of election comes around.").
122. See, e.g., id. at 495 (Rep. Ames) ("Ifthe President is inclined to shelter
himself behind the Senate, with respect to having an improper person in
office, we lose the responsibility, which is our greatest security; the blame
among so many will be lost."); id. at 509 (Rep. Clymer) ("If the President is
divested of this power, his responsibility is destroyed.... ."). In answer to the
claim that impeachment supplied the sole basis for removing an officer,
Madison added that "[tlhe threat to liberty, the danger of mal-administration
has not yet been found to lie so much in the facility of introducing improper
persons into office, as in the difficulty of displacing those who are unworthy of
the public trust." Id. at 515.
123. See id. at 495 (Rep. Ames) ("[Aldvantages may result from keeping
the power of removal in terrorem over the heads of the officers; they will be
stimulated to do their duty to the satisfaction of the principal, who is
responsible for the whole executive department.").
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the public would suffer a "most manifest injury" if the
President and a subordinate could "go on pulling in different
ways."

124

At least initially, opposition to the express removal clause
came largely from the senatorial party. Members of that group
thoughtfully and substantively engaged proponents of inherent
presidential removal power. With regard to principal officers
appointed by and with the advice and consent of the Senate,
the senatorial party contended that the entity possessing the
power to appoint traditionally also enjoyed the power to
remove. 125 As Elbridge Gerry thus explained, "it is in the
nature of things, that the power which appoints, removes also.
If there are deviations from this general rule, the instances are
few, and not sufficient to warrant our attention.' 2 6 The
senatorial party also emphasized that the Constitution blends,
rather than separates, the government's powers; hence, giving
the President and Senate joint authority over removals flowed
naturally from their joint constitutional responsibility for
appointments. 127 Some further maintained that, without the
124. Id. at 581 (Rep. Baldwin).
125. Elbridge Gerry thus explained:
What clause is it that gives this power in express terms? I believe
there is none such. If there is a power of removal, besides that by
impeachment, it must vest somewhere. It must vest in the President,
or in the President and the Senate, or in the President, Senate, and
House of Representatives. Now, there is no clause which expressly
vests it in the President. I believe no gentleman contends it is in this
House, because that would be that mingling of executive and
legislative powers gentlemen deprecate. I presume, then, gentlemen
will grant, that if there is such a power, it vests with the President,
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, who are the body
that appoints.... If the power of removal vests where I suppose, we,
by this declaration, undertake to transfer it to the President alone.
1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS, supra note 108, at 395-96; see, e.g., id. at 396 (Rep.
Bland) ("The constitution declares, that the President and the Senate shall
appoint, and it naturally follows that the power which appoints shall remove
also."); id. at 510 (Rep. Sherman) (I consider it as an established principle
that the power which appoints can also remove, unless there are express
exceptions made."); id. at 559 (Rep. Sherman) (I have not heard any
gentleman produce an authority from law or history which proves, that where
two branches are interested in the appointment, one of them has the power of
removal."); id. at 576-77 (Rep. Jackson) ('The words of the constitution
forcibly imply our construction; and it has never yet been proved, nay, it has
hardly been controverted, that the power which appoints is not the power to
remove.").
126. Id. at 596 (Rep. Gerry).
127. See, e.g., id. at 575 (Rep. Jackson) (arguing that governmental powers
"are blended; not to be sure, in so high or dangerous a degree, but in all
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Senate as a check, the President would have the power
arbitrarily to dismiss executive officers, 128 and that an
illimitable presidential removal power would grant the
President a form of dispensing power. 129 Indeed, many feared
that recognizing an inherent presidential removal power would
transform the President into a monarch. 130 Finally, the
senatorial party challenged the Madisonian understanding of
the "executive Power" with evidence of state constitutional
practice, which commonly denied removal authority to
governors in whose hands the state executive power was
31
placed.1
The claims of the congressional party were, in many
respects, the most measured. Proponents of congressional
regulatory authority argued that if the Constitution did not
possible forms they are capable of receiving"); id- at 485 (Rep. Stone) ("[11f no
such principle [of separation of powers] is declared in the constitution, and
that instrument has adopted exceptions, I think we ought to follow those
exceptions, step by step, in every case to which they bear relation.").
128. See, e.g., id. at 475 (Rep. Smith of South Carolina) ("I imagine, sir, we
are declaring a power in the President which may hereafter be greatly
abused .... "); id. at 540 (Rep. Page) ("Ifyou take from [the Senate] their right
to check the President in the removal of officers, they cannot prevent the
dismission of a faithful servant, who has opposed the arbitrary mandates of
an ambitious President.").
129. See id. at 597 (Rep. Gerry) ("[T]he President is to have the power of
preventing the execution; the office, and its duties, are suspended on the
pleasure of the President. Suppose an officer discharges his duty as the law
directs, yet the President will remove him ..... ).
130. See id. at 505 (Rep. Jackson) ("It has been mentioned that in all
Governments the Executive Magistrate has the power of dismissing officers
under him. This may hold good in Europe, where monarchs claim their
powers jure divino, but it never can be admitted in America, under a
constitution delegating only enumerated powers."); ii at 509 (Rep. Page) ("I
venture to assert, that this clause of the bill contains in it the seeds of royal
prerogative."); id. at 596 (Rep. Gerry) ("In Great Britain, this is the
prerogative of the throne; where it is likewise held a maxim, that the King can
do no wrong.").
131. Id. at 491 (Rep. Gerry) ("Is [the] maxim [of inherent presidential
removal power] supported by precedent drawn from the practice of the
individual states? The direct contrary is established.... How then can the
gentlemen assert that the powers of appointment and removal are incidental
to the Executive Department of Government?"); i at 534 (Rep. White) ("Each
State has an Executive Magistrate; but look at his powers, and I believe it will
not be found that he has in any one, of necessity, the right of appointing or
removing officers."); id- at 570 (Rep. Page) ("Has any State of the Union ever
thought it necessary to put such a power into the hands of their Chief
Magistrate, in order to secure the liberties of the citizen? If it is that great
security which some gentlemen seem to think, it is strange that it should
never, as yet, have been thought of under the State Governments.").
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speak to the removal of executive officers, the matter fell to
Congress under the Necessary and Proper Clause. 3 2 On that
assumption, establishing the tenure of office and prescribing
the conditions for discharging its occupant were incidental to
the legislative power to create the office.1 33 Representative
Hartley aptly expressed that position when he observed:
If [the removal power] is omitted [from the Constitution], and the
power is necessary and essential to the Government and to the great
interests of the United States, who are to make the provision and
supply the defect? Certainly the Legislature is the proper body. It is
declared they shall establish offices by law. The establishment of an
office implies every thing relative to its formation, constitution, and
termination; consequently, the Congress are authorized to declare
4
their judgment on each of these points."

To be sure, when it came to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
many in the congressional party believed that Congress should
exercise its discretion to vest the removal power in the
President alone. 135 Yet many also thought it important to

132. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17; see, e.g., 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS, supra
note 108, at 545 (Rep. Sedgwick) ([T]he constitution vests the power of
removal, by necessary implication in the Government of the United States.
Have not Congress, therefore, the power of making what laws they think
proper to carry into execution the powers vested by the constitution in the
Government of the United States?"); id. at 584 (Rep. Sylvester) ("Now, I would
infer.., that the House having the power lodged with them of creating
offices, and passing all laws necessary to carry the constitution into effect,
they have a right to declare the tenure by which the office shall be held.").
133. See, e.g., id. at 392 (Rep. Lawrence) ("[Als the constitution was silent
with respect to the time the Secretary of Foreign Affairs should remain in
office ... it therefore depended upon the will of the Legislature to say how the
department should be constituted and established by law, and the conditions
upon which he shall enjoy the office. We can say he shall hold it for three
years from his appointment, or during good behavior; and we may declare
unfitness and incapacity causes of removal and make the President alone
judge of this case."); id. at 511 (Rep. Sherman) ("As the officer is the mere
creature of the Legislature, we may form it under such regulations as we
please, with such powers and such duration as we think good policy
requires."); id. at 565 (Rep. Sedgwick) ("[Tihe Legislature were at liberty to
determine that an officer should be removable by the President, or by whom
they pleased; that he was absolutely the creature of the law, and subject to
legislative discretion.").
134 See id. at 503.
135. See id. at 500 (Rep. Hartley) ("Under these circumstances... I have
no doubt in my own mind, that this office is during pleasure, and that the
power of removal which is a mere temporary one, ought to be in the President,
whose powers, taken together, are not very numerous, and the success of this
Government depends upon their being unimpaired."); ii at 542 (Rep.
Sedgwick) ("I say it would be absurd, in the highest degree, to continue such a
person in office contrary to the will of the President, who is responsible that
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a different
reserve legislative discretion to prescribe 36
warranted.
circumstances
the
where
arrangement
Because much of the congressional party appeared to
support presidential removal power as the best disposition of
the question before the House, one might have thought that the
congressional and presidential parties would join in voting for
the express removal clause-the former on the ground that it
reflected a wise exercise of legislative discretion, the latter as a
means of declaring its sense of Article II. In the end, however,
key members of the presidential party changed course, seeking
to distance themselves from anything that might imply
legislative control over the removal question. Madison, for
example, argued that if the removal power derived from Article
H, Congress had no right to disturb that allocation of
authority: "The powers relative to offices are partly legislative
and partly executive. The Legislature creates the office,
defines the powers, limits its duration, and annexes a
37
compensation. This done, the legislative power ceases."
That sentiment took concrete form in a legislative maneuver by
Egbert Benson of New York to strike the express removal
clause. A stalwart of the presidential party, he feared that an
express removal provision would imply that Congress, rather
than the Constitution, had supplied the President's
authority. 138 Benson initially attempted simply to strike the
clause, but that motion failed. 39 He ultimately achieved that
objective, however, through a two step process. First, he
moved to add language that would give implied recognition to
the President's removal power, proposing a clause that gave a
clerk custody of departmental papers "whenever the

the business be conducted with propriety, and for the general interest of the
nation."); id. at 584 (Rep. Sylvester) ("The President is the whole executive
branch of Government; and yet you so fetter him, by attaching to him a
legislative branch, that he has little or no agency in displacing a public officer
who holds his commission of him alone.").
136. See, e.g., id. at 499 (Rep. Sedgwick) ("[We must consider every
[nonjudicial] office according to its nature, and regulate it in a corresponding
manner.); id. at 607 (Rep. Tucker) ("I apprehend a law is necessary in every
instance to determine the exercise of the power. In some cases, it may be
proper to that the President alone should have it. I am not clear in my own
mind, what general rule, if any, can be established on this subject.").
137. Id. at 604.
138. Id. at 525 ("If we declare in the bill that the officer shall be removable
by the President, it has the appearance of conferring the power upon him.").
139. See id. at 599 (noting that the motion failed by a vote of 20 to 34).
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[Secretary] shall be removed by the President."140 Second,
Benson made clear that if his first motion succeeded, he would
next move "to strike out the words... 'to be removable by the
President,' which appeared somewhat like a grant."14 1
Although at least some members of the congressional party
supported Benson's motion to give implied recognition to
presidential removal power,142 several objected to striking the
express removal provision on the ground that its excision
would imply a lack of legislative control over removal. 43
Prominent members of the presidential party spoke in favor of
Benson's motions on the same ground.1 44 In separate votes, the
140. Id. at 601 (Rep. Benson).
141. Id. (Rep. Benson).
142. See, e.g., CURRIE, supra note 117, at 40-41; THACH, supra note 92, at
154.
143. Theodore Sedgwick, for example, argued that deleting the clause
would unnecessarily force the issue:
[T]here seem to be two opinions dividing the majority of this House.
Some of these gentlemen seem to suppose that, by the constitution,
and by implication and certain deduction from the principles of the
constitution, the power vests in the President. Others think it is a
matter of legislative determination, and that they must give it to the
President. Now, suppose either of these sentiments be just, there is
no impropriety in the other's assenting to the mode of expression
already adopted [the express removal clause]; yet, if the latter
opinion which I stated is true, there is an evident impropriety in
agreeing to the amendment, and it may tend more properly to divide
than unite the House.
1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS, supra note 108, at 602 (Rep. Sedgwick). For
additional arguments of the congressional party, see, for example, id. at 605
(Rep. Sedgwick) ("[Hie thought it was the discretion of the Legislature to
authorize the exercise of [the removal power], because they had complete
power over the duration of the offices they created. Hence he deemed it
necessary to make an express grant of the power of removal; but strike out
these words, and there is no express grant in the bill."); id. at 606 (Rep.
Lawrence) (speaking "against striking out the words, because he thought the
Legislature had power to establish offices on what terms they pleased"); id at
607 (Rep. Tucker) ("If we say the President may remove from office, it is a
grant of power; and we can repeal the law, and prevent the abuse of it. But if
we, by law, imply that it is a constitutional right vested in the President,
there will be a privilege gained, which the Legislature cannot affect; at least,
the reversion of such a solemn opinion will occasion much inconvenience, not
to say confusion.").
144. See, e.g., id. at 604 (Rep. Madison) ("First, altering the mode of
expression tends to give satisfaction to those gentlemen who think it not an
object of legislative expression; and second, because the amendment already
agreed to fully contains the sense of the House upon the doctrine of the
constitution; and therefore the words are unnecessary as they stand there.");
id. at 608 (Rep. Vining) (noting that he "acquiesced in striking it out, because
he was satisfied that the constitution vested the Power in the President").
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House ultimately decided first to adopt the clause impliedly
recognizing presidential removal power and then to delete the
express removal clause.1 45 The bill passed the House as
amended, 146 and secured the approval of the Senate in an
equally divided vote, with Vice President Adams breaking the
47
tie.1
What bearing should the decision of the First Congress
have on the proper interpretation of "good cause" in the
independent counsel statute, passed by the 104th Congress
more than two centuries later? Some have treated the decision
of 1789 as an authoritative constitutional precedent
establishing that the President has illimitable removal power,
at least in some contexts.148 To establish the decision of 1789's

145. A number of the members of the senatorial party joined in striking
out the express removal clause. See THACH, supra note 92, at 154-55.
Although Boudinot believed that the President had constitutional power to
"remove, without limitation," he voted against striking the clause because "he
was clear for making a legislative declaration, in order to prevent future
inconvenience." 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS, supra note 108, at 606.
146. 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS, supra note 108, at 614.
147. See THACH, supra note 92, at 155-58. Although the Senate did not
keep official records, Professor Thach has argued that informal records
suggest that "the matter of removal was voted upon by the Senate with a full
knowledge of what it signified in all its aspects." Id. at 157. Because I rely
only upon the persuasive force of the House deliberations, see infra text
accompanying notes 150-163, I will not undertake to examine Professor
Thach's claim.
148. See, e.g., ExParte Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230, 259 (1839) ("Ilt was
very early adopted, as the practical construction of the Constitution, that this
power [to remove principal officers] was vested in the President alone. And
such would appear to have been the legislative construction of the
Constitution [in 1789]."); 4 Op. Att'y Gen. 1, 1 (1842) ("Whatever I might have
thought of the power of removal from office, if the subject were res integra, it
is now too late to dispute the settled construction of 1789. It is according to
that construction, from the very nature of executive power, absolute in the
President, subject only to his responsibility to the country (his constituent) for
a breach of such a vast and solemn trust."); JOSEPH STORY, COM[MENTARIES
ON THE CONSTITUTION §§ 799-800, at 572-73 (Ronald D. Rotunda & John E.
Nowak eds., 1987) ("The public... acquiesced in [the Decision of 1789]; and it
constitutes, perhaps, the most extraordinary case in the history of
government of a power, conferred by implication on the executive, by a bare
majority of congress, which has not been questioned since.... If there has
been any aberration from the true constitutional exposition of the power of
removal, which the reader must decide for himself, it will be difficult, and
perhaps impracticable, after forty years' experience, to recall the practice to
the true theory."); 1 JAMES KENT, COMlENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 310-11
(John M. Gould ed., 1896) ("The question has never been made the subject of a
judicial discussion; and the construction given to the Constitution in 1789 has
continued to rest on this loose, incidental, declaratory opinion of Congress,
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relevance to a proper interpretation of "good cause," however,
one need not go that far.1 49 Properly understood, the decision
of 1789 at least offers persuasive evidence of a more modest
and, for present purposes, more relevant proposition-that
claims of inherent Article II removal authority raise a serious
constitutional question, the type that in modem times
commonly warrants the invocation of the canon of avoidance.
I
have elsewhere
argued that post-ratification
interpretations of the Constitution properly inform modem
constitutional decisionmaking, at least in part, because they
"reflect the considered analyses of intelligent observers far
closer to the relevant events than we are today."150 Indeed, the
Court often consults early legislative interpretations of the
Constitution, not on the assumption that they somehow settle
the question, but because the early legislators who adopted
them "must have had a keen awareness of the influences which
had shaped the Constitution and the restrictions which it
and the sense and practice of government since that time. It may now be
considered firmly and definitively settled, and there is good sense and
practical utility in the.construction.").
149. Treating the decision of 1789 as an authoritative constitutional
precedent appears to build on Madison's famous argument, first expressed in
The Federalist, that the Constitution would inevitably contain ambiguities,
whose meaning would be "liquidated," in part, by governmental practice. See
THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 229 (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (James Madison)
("All new laws, though penned with the greatest technical skill, and passed on
the fullest and most mature deliberation, are considered as more or less
obscure and equivocal, until their meaning be liquidated and ascertained by a
series of particular discussions and adjudications."); see also, e.g., Stuart v.
Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299, 300 (1803) (Marshall, C.J.) (reasoning that the
constitutionality of requiring the Justices to ride circuit had been settled by a
"contemporary practical exposition" of the Constitution); H. Jefferson Powell,
The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 919,

921, 936, 939-41, 943-44 (1985) (describing evidence that the founding
generation expected ambiguities in constitutional meaning to be settled, at
least in part, by practice).
Madison's premise is assuredly open to debate. Marbury itself makes
clear that the early Congresses sometimes enacted unconstitutional statutes,
and that the federal courts retain full authority to say so in their exercise of
"the judicial Power." See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 175-80
(1803) (invaliding Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789); see also Lessig &
Sunstein, supra note 16, at 13 n.47 (cataloguing some of those statutes); cf.
Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 19, at 550-51 (questioning the legitimacy of
relying on "the Constitution's postenactment 'legislative' history"). The
legitimacy of giving authoritative effect to early practical constructions of the
Constitution is beyond the scope of this Comment.
150. John F. Manning, Textualism and the Role of The Federalist in
ConstitutionalAdjudication,66 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1337, 1356 (1998).
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embodied, since all questions which were related to the
Constitution and its adoption must have been, at that early
date, vividly impressed on their minds." 151 Thus, modem
interpreters should care about the substance of the debates
surrounding the decision of 1789 because they reflect
persuasive accounts of constitutional meaning by eighteenthcentury Americans who were steeped in the assumptions of
contemporary law and politics. 52 Read in that spirit, the
debates concerning the decision of 1789 persuasively
demonstrate that the removal power raised a serious and
difficult constitutional question. As previously discussed,
proponents of inherent presidential removal power made
careful and intricate arguments about the nature of the
executive power, the proper influence of the separation of
153
powers, and the implications of the Take Care Clause.
Although the proponents of inherent presidential removal
power did not rely exclusively on such arguments,1 54 the main

151. Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 56 (1899); accord, e.g., Wisconsin v.
Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265, 297 (1888) ("That act.., was passed by the
first congress assembled under the constitution, many of whose members had
taken part in framing that instrument, and is contemporaneous and weighty
evidence of its true meaning.").
152. See Manning, supra note 150, at 1357. Chief Justice Taft's opinion for
the Court in Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926), suggests a similar
(though not identical) basis for considering the decisions of the First Congress:
We have devoted much space to this discussion and decision of the
question of the presidential power of removal in the First Congress,
not because a congressional conclusion on a constitutional issue is
conclusive, but first because of our agreement with the reasons upon
which it was avowedly based, second because this was the decision of
the First Congress on a question of primary importance in the
organization of the government made within two years after the
Constitutional Convention and a much shorter time after its
ratification, and third because that Congress numbered among its
leaders those who had been members of the convention.
Id. at 136. Note that the primary reason for the Court's reliance was its
"agreement" with the arguments made by those most familiar with the
relevant historical context.
153. See supra text accompanying notes 114-118.
154. For example, some argued in the alternative that the Appointments
Clause, in fact, gave the President the power to appoint (subject only to
senatorial assent), and that the President enjoyed the power to remove under
the principle that removal followed appointment. See, e.g., 1 ANNALS OF
CONGRESS, supra note 108, at 484 (Rep. Vining) ("It may be contended, on the
gentleman's principles, that the President shall have the power of removal;
because it is he who appoints."); id. at 547 (Rep. Boudinot) ("The President
nominates and appoints; he is further expressly authorized to commission all
officers. Now, does it appear from this distribution of power that the Senate
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thrust of the Madisonian forces was that the removal authority
generally derived from the President's unitary control over all
subordinate officers performing executive functions.1 55 To be
sure, proponents of senatorial power engaged these arguments
seriously, 156 sometimes taking strong issue with the
assumptions that underlay claims of inherent presidential
authority.' 57 Yet it was not uncommon for proponents of
senatorial power, 158 any less than proponents of inherent
appoints."). Corwin has suggested that such observations cast doubt on the
coherence of the arguments favoring presidential removal power. See Corwin,
supra note 21, at 362. Yet the tenor of these arguments suggests that they
were largely defensive, calculated to respond specifically to the contentions of
those who advocated inherent senatorial power to give advice and consent to
removals.
155. See 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS, supra note 108, at 514 (Rep. Madison) ("I
feel the importance of this question, and know that our decision will involve
the decision of all similar cases."); id. at 518 (Rep. Madison) (arguing that "the
lowest officers, the middle grade, and the highest, will depend, as they ought,
on the President"). The proponents of senatorial power seized on the
generality of the arguments made by the Madisonian forces, focusing
particularly on the implications of the Madisonian position for the Treasury.
See, e.g., id. at 507 (Rep. Jackson) ("If [the President] wants to establish an
arbitrary authority, and finds the Secretary of Finance not inclined to second
his endeavors, he has nothing more to do than to remove him, and get one
appointed of principles more congenial to his own."); id. at 522 (Rep. Gerry)
("But what consequence may result from giving the President absolute control
over all officers? Among the rest, I presume he is to have an unlimited control
over the officers of the Treasury."); id. at 552 (Rep. Jackson) ("[Ilf the
President has the power of removing all officers who may be virtuous enough
to oppose his base measures, what would become of the liberties of our fellowcitizens?"). The proponents of inherent presidential power engaged these
arguments on the merits, rather than denying the premise of wide-ranging
presidential control. See, e.g., id. at 494 (Rep. Ames) (arguing that the
President needs a "sudden and decisive remedy" in the event that the
Treasurer sought "to betray the public chest to the enemy, and so injure the
Government beyond the possibility of reparation"); id. at 553-54 (Rep. Scott)
("[Tihe constitution says that no money shall be taken out the Treasury but by
appropriations; this alone, I think, a sufficient answer to all that has been
said, and will serve to soften down the harsh features which the terrible
picture I have just now mentioned displayed.").
156. The senatorial party took the lead in answering the claims of inherent
presidential authority. See supra text accompanying notes 125-131.
157. Many proponents of senatorial power felt that their position was
clearly implied by established governmental practice. They also forcefully
relied on the contrast between the Madisonian conception of federal executive
power and contradictory state constitutional practice. See supra text
accompanying notes 125-126, 131.
158. See, e.g., 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS, supra note 108, at 398 (Rep. Page)
(requesting "the committee to delay the decision of this question, because he
did not wish gentlemen to commit themselves, without having fully reflected
upon the subject"); id. at 523 (Rep. Gerry) ("The system, it cannot be denied, is
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presidential power, 159 to make pleas for careful deliberation or,
otherwise, to acknowledge the complexity or uncertainty of the
constitutional question before the House.1 60 In addition, one of
the most influential members of the congressional party
backed a legislative grant of presidential removal power
in many parts obscure.... "); id. at 533 (Rep. White of Virginia) ("This
question, complicated in its nature, and interesting in its consequences, has
occasioned a serious and solemn debate...."); id. at 558 (Rep. Sumter) ("Ie
had received considerable information from the discussion which had already
taken place, and he hoped that more light would still be thrown upon it, if
gentlemen were not precluded from pursuing the subject by a precipitate call
for the question."); id- at 587 (Rep. Stone) ("It has been said, that if we have a
right to dismiss, the right vests in the President, because he nominates and
appoints. It has been said, that if the Government has the power, it belongs
to the President and the Senate. Whichever of these assertions is true, it is
founded on implication.").
159. See id. at 561 (Rep. Ames) ("It must be admitted that the constitution
is not explicit on the point in contest; yet the constitution strongly infers that
the power is in the President alone.... [Ihf it is at the disposal of [Congress],
clearly we ought not to bestow it on the Senate; for the doubt, whether the
President is not already entitled to it, is an argument against placing it in
other hands."); id- at 578 (Rep. Baldwin) ("I do not like to construe over much.
It is a very delicate and critical branch of our duty; and there is not, perhaps,
any part of the constitution on which we should be more cautious and
circumspect than on the present."); id. at 582 (Rep. Baldwin) ("The great
division of this committee proves that it is a question not so easily resolved as
others which have heretofore engaged our attention."); id. at 593 (Rep. Vining)
("I am confounded with the diversity of arguments used on this occasion. I
know not how to reply."). Madison himself shifted from a firm advocacy of
congressional regulatory authority to an equally firm position in favor of
inherent presidential power during the course of the debate. See supra note
112. And Representative Vining argued that Congress should recognize
presidential removal authority regardless of whether it came from Article H
or the Necessary and Proper Clause. See 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS, supra note
108, at 532. ("If the Constitution does not prohibit the exercise of this power,
I conceive it to be granted, either as incidental to the executive department, or
under that clause which gives Congress all powers necessary and proper to
carry the constitution into effect. This being the case, we are at liberty to
construe, from the principles and expressions of the constitution, where the
power resides.").
160. Indeed, recognition of the uncertainty of the question was what led
some to call for a legislative construction of the Constitution. Fisher Ames
perhaps put it best when he said:
[Tihere are three opinions entertained by gentlemen on this subject.
One is, that the power of removal is prohibited by the constitution;
the next is, that it requires it by the President; and the other is, that
the constitution is totally silent. It therefore appears to me proper
for the House to declare what is their sense of the constitution.
1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS, supra note 108, at 496; see also, e.g., id. at 479 (Rep.
Madison) (acknowledging that "if [the removal question] relates to a doubtful
part of the constitution, I suppose an exposition of the constitution may come
from the Legislature, as from any other department of the Government").
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precisely in order to sidestep a serious constitutional question
concerning the scope of that power. 161 Even if one were
ultimately to disagree with the conclusions reached by the
proponents of inherent presidential removal power, it is hard
to say, after reading the debates in their entirety, that the
Madisonian arguments were not substantial or that they were
not taken seriously.
In interpreting the removal provisions of the independent
counsel statute, the decision of 1789 thus may offer persuasive
reasons for concluding that a narrow construction of "good
cause"-one that omits disobedience to the President's legal
directives-would raise a serious question under Article H.162
The Article H arguments advanced by Madison and his allies
were substantial, and the final disposition of the bill at least
took Madison's claims seriously enough to avoid contradicting
them. 163 If a court were to follow a similar path of avoidance in

161. See id. at 608 (Rep. Hartley) ("He owned that he had some doubts on
this head himself [the inherent removal power of the President]; perhaps
some others might be in the same predicament; but he had none with respect
to the propriety of the President's exercising that prerogative, and therefore
should readily consent to grant it."). Other proponents of congressional
regulatory power expressed more general doubts about the constitutional
question. See, e.g., id. at 561 (Rep. Sedgwick) ("He had undertaken to say
that the Legislature were at liberty to determine that an officer should be
removable by the President, or by whom it pleased ....
He also said it was
more plausibly contended that the power of removal was more constitutionally
in the President than in the Senate; but he did not say that the arguments on
either side were conclusive."); id. at 583 (Rep. Sylvester) (referring to "the
controversy we have had.., and the contrariety of sentiments advanced").
162. One might argue that the sharp disagreement about the meaning of
Article H in the early Republic suggests that courts should simply defer to
modem Congresses' resolution of the problem. Such a conclusion would
reflect James Bradley Thayer's premise that courts should sustain legislation
unless Congress could be said to have made a "very clear [mistake]-so clear
that it is not open to rational question." James Bradley Thayer, The Origin
and Scope of the American Doctrine of ConstitutionalLaw, 7 HARV. L. REV.
129, 136 (1893). Even if one were to accept Thayer's premise, it is still
possible to conclude that courts should construe statutes, where feasible, to
avoid serious doubts about their constitutionality-a course that avoids
unnecessary judicial invalidation of legislation. In any case, it is at least open
to question whether Thayer's conception reflects the received tradition of
American constitutional law. See, e.g., Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the
AdministrativeState, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 8-10 (1983).
163. In his opinion for the Court in Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52,
115 (1926), Chief Justice Taft perhaps overstated the case when he said that
Madison's "arguments in support of the President's constitutional power of
removal independently of congressional provision, and without the consent of
the Senate... carried the House." In recent scholarship analyzing the voting
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construing the "good cause" provision, moreover, its decision
In Shurtleff v. United
would hardly be unprecedented.
States,164 decided early in this century, the Court made clear
that it would demand "explicit language... before holding the
power of the President to have been taken away by an act of
Congress."' 65 In the Court's view, Congress could not restrict
presidential control over an executive officer's tenure "without
stating such intention in plain and explicit language, instead of
leaving it to be implied from doubtful inferences." 166 Although
Shurtleff has had little generative capacity, the lessons of the
First Congress may suggest that there was wisdom in its
approach.
Reading "good cause" to permit presidential

coalitions that ultimately produced the decision of 1789, David Currie
suggests that it is hard to read the ultimate outcome as an unalloyed victory

for the Madisonian forces:
For better or worse, the two halves of Benson's proposal were put to
the House separately. The members first voted thirty to eighteen to
add Benson's "whenever" language. All those who had spoken in
favor of presidential removal voted aye, whether they thought that
Article 11 settled the question or left the matter to Congress. The
House then voted thirty-one to nineteen to drop the phrase "to be
removable by the President." The numbers were virtually identical,
but it was a different majority. For on this question, the proponents
of Article H power prevailed only because they were joined by a
substantial number of members who had opposed presidential
removal altogether.
The original coalition was patched up again when it came time for
the House to pass the amended bill, and after similar discussion in
the Senate Benson's "whenever" formula became law. Thus it was
the considered judgment of the majority in both Houses that the
President could remove the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, but there
was no consensus as to whether he got that authority from Congress
or from the Constitution itself.
CURRIE, supra note 117, at 40-41 (footnotes omitted). At a minimum,
however, the final bill's deletion of the express removal provision avoided any
contradiction of Madison's position.
164. 189 U.S. 311 (1903).
165. Id. at 316.
166. Id. The statute at issue in Shurtleffprovided that a general appraiser
of merchandise "may be removed at any time by the President for inefficiency,
neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office." Id. at 313 (citation omitted). The
President had removed Shurtleff from that office without cause, provoking a
suit for back pay. Shurtleff argued that "because the statute specified certain
causes for which the officer might be removed, it thereby impliedly denied the
right to remove for any other cause." Id. at 316. As a matter of ordinary
statutory construction, this was a reasonable position; if the enumerated
causes had not supplied the exclusive basis for presidential removal, the
enumeration would have served no function. Nevertheless, after invoking
Madisonian premises, the Court applied its rule of narrow construction to
reject Shurtleffs argument. See id. at 315-16.
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direction and control over contestable legal questions would
avoid entering what the First Congress persuasively showed to
be a dangerous constitutional thicket-one perhaps wisely to
be avoided in the absence of clear congressional direction to the
contrary.
CONCLUSION
No analysis of the decision of 1789 could supply a firm
answer to the removal question. Full consideration of that
question would entail an extended analysis of innumerable
doctrinal
and
historical
post-ratification
and
predevelopments-an inquiry that exceeds the scope of this paper.
Do the lessons of 1789 apply only to officers, like the Secretary
of Foreign Affairs, whom the President appoints with the
advice and consent of the Senate?1 67 Does it extend to Article II
167. See Myers, 272 U.S. at 114 (arguing that "the vote was, and was
intended to be a declaration that the power to remove officers appointed by
the President and the Senate vested in the President alone"). Along similar
lines, in Perkins v. United States, 116 U.S. 483 (1886), the Court held that
Congress may regulate the removal of inferior officers when, by the terms of
the Appointments Clause, it has vested their appointment in "the President
alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments." U.S. CONST.
art. II, § 2, cl. 2. As the Court explained:
Whether or not congress can restrict the power of removal incident to
the power of appointment of those officers who are appointed by the
president by and with the advice and consent of the senate, under the
authority of the constitution, does not arise in this case, and need not
be considered. We have no doubt that when congress, by law, vests
the appointment of inferior officers in the heads of departments, it
may limit and restrict the power of removal as it deems best for the
public interest. The constitutional authority in congress to thus vest
the appointment implies authority to limit, restrict, and regulate the
removal by such laws as congress may enact in relation to the officers
so appointed. The head of a department has no constitutional
prerogative of appointment to offices independently of the legislation
of congress, and by such legislation he must be governed, not only in
making appointments, but in all that is incident thereto.
Perkins, 116 U.S. at 484-85 (citation omitted). This distinction between
principal and inferior officers seems open to question if one starts from the
assumption that the removal power is necessary to fulfill the President's duty
to ensure the faithful execution of the laws. An inferior officer, no less able
than a principal officer, is capable of faithless execution of the laws. See
Donovan & Irvine, supra note 67, at 227-28 (criticizing Perkins). Indeed, it is
doubtful whether Perkins' recognition of plenary congressional authority to
limit the removal of inferior officers remains good law. In a recent decision,
the Court indicated that to be an "inferior officer" in the executive branch, a
more senior executive officer must possess at least some supervisory
authority. See Edmond v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 1573, 1580-81 (1997) ("IMn
the context of a clause designed to preserve political accountability relative to
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officers to whom Congress has assigned adjudicative, rather
than classically executive, functions? 68 More generally, are
there categories of administrative officers whose functions lie

important government assignments, we think it evident that Inferior officers'
are officers whose work is directed and supervised at some level by others who
were appointed by presidential nomination with the advice and consent of the
Senate."); see also Eric Bravin, Note, Is Morrison v. Olson Still Good Law?
The Court's New Appointments Clause Jurisprudence, 98 COLUM. L. REV.
1103, 1117-20 (1998) (discussing Edmond). Hence, if Congress has effectively
insulated an executive officer from the direction of a superior executive
officer, the former may no longer qualify as an inferior officer for purposes of
the Appointments Clause. The foregoing discussion is not meant to resolve
that difficult question, but rather to illustrate the complexity of properly
interpreting the decision of 1789.
168. The Court has often approved the delegation of Article I business to
non-Article III tribunals. See, e.g., CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986);
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1935). It has also held that administrative
agencies can properly adjudicate federal claims that fall under the loose
rubric of "public rights." See, e.g., Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co.,
473 U.S. 568 (1985) (environmental regulation); Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135
(1921) (federal landlord/tenant law); Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438
(1929) (tariff dispute). In Myers, for example, Chief Justice Taft indicated
that the President cannot necessarily use the removal power to dictate the
outcome of an adjudication. 272 U.S. at 135 ("Then there may be duties of a
quasi judicial character imposed on executive officers and members of
executive tribunals whose decisions after hearing affect interests of
individuals, the discharge of which the President cannot in a particular case
properly influence or control."). Indeed, the distinction between purely
executive and adjudicative powers may trace back to remarks that Madison
made during the First Congress's debate over the Comptroller of the
Treasury, whose duties included determining claims against the United
States. See, e.g., CURRIE, supra note 117, at 41 n.245 (discussing debate over
Comptroller); Donovan & Irvine, supra note 67, at 219-20 n.19 (same).
Compare, e.g., 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS, supra note 108, at 636 (Rep. Madison)
("Whatever... may be my opinion with respect to the tenure by which an
executive officer may hold his office according to the meaning of the
constitution, I am very well satisfied, that a modification by the Legislature
may take place in such as partake of the judicial qualities .... "), with id. at
637 (Rep. Sedgwick) ("[A] majority of the House had decided that all officers
concerned in executive business should depend upon the will of the President
for their continuance in office; and with good reason, for they were the eyes
and ears of the principal Magistrate, the instruments of execution. Now the
office of Comptroller seemed to bear a strong affinity to this branch of the
Government."). Madison, however, ultimately did not propose to limit the
President's power to remove the Comptroller. See id. at 636 (Rep. Madison)
(arguing that "the Comptroller would be dependent upon the President,
because he can be removed by him"). And Congress ultimately did not specify
the conditions under which the President might remove the Comptroller. See
CURRIE, supra note 117, at 41 n.245. The question whether Congress can
insulate an adjudicative official from the President's removal power is beyond
the scope of this Comment.
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beyond the President's control? 69 Rather than trying to offer
firm answers to those and countless other questions implicated
by the removal debate, 170 this Comment has sought to
demonstrate that interpreters in the earliest days of our
Republic persuasively established that the basic Article II
claim of inherent presidential removal power involves a serious
and difficult constitutional question. Given their intimate
familiarity with the legal and political background of the
169. Professors Lessig and Sunstein, for example, have argued that the
early Congresses composed the Department of Treasury and the Post Office
differently from the Departments of Foreign Affairs, War, and Navy. Lessig
& Sunstein, supra note 16, at 27-30. For the Treasury Department and the
Post Office, they argue, "Congress granted the President no clearly stated or
implied authority over the affairs of the relevant officers, and did not hesitate
to articulate the full range of departmental structures and officers, complete
with a full specification of the duties such officers had." Id. at 30. Lessig and
Sunstein thus conclude "[slome departments the framing Congresses treated
as purely executive and some not." Id. Professors Calabresi and Prakash
have replied that the differences among the departments bear less
significance than Lessig and Sunstein suggest, and that the founding
generation regarded them as "executive" departments. See Calabresi &
Prakash, supra note 19, at 647-58.
170. Indeed, one would have to examine the history of prosecution. Lessig
and Sunstein have suggested that the longstanding practice of private
prosecution reflected in qui tam actions contradicts the idea of
constitutionally mandated presidential control over prosecution. Lessig &
Sunstein, supra note 16, at 14-22. That concern requires serious attention,
but does not necessarily negate the force of Madisonian premises on the
question of criminal prosecution. Consider the following analogy. To some
extent, private parties enforce federal law whenever Congress creates a
private right of action. Civil lawsuits seeking treble damages under the
Sherman Act, for example, surely enforce important federal policies favoring
competition. Yet the President has no authority to supervise private litigants.
It does not follow, however, that when Copgress opts to rely on federal
officials, rather than private litigants, to enforce such policies, it is free to give
them full independence from presidential supervision. Indeed, the felt
imperative to rely on federal officials for law enforcement may serve as a
structural check on Congress's ability to assign the execution of federal policy
to officials beyond the President's control.
Similar reasoning applies to evidence that in the early days of the
Republic, state officials beyond the President's direct control sometimes
conducted federal prosecutions. See, e.g., Krent, supra note 19, at 303-04
(discussing state prosecutions of federal offenses); Lessig & Sunstein, supra
note 16, at 19 (same). As Lessig and Sunstein note: "[Tihere an important
difference between vesting executive authority in a state official and vesting
executive authority in a federal official not directly responsible to the
President. Only the latter is subject to the machinations of Congress, and
hence the former might be considered constitutionally distinct." Id. at 19
n.76. By analogy, state court judges without life tenure and salary protection
may constitutionally decide federal matters that, if handled by federal
officials, would demand the protections of Article I.
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Constitution, we could scarcely hope to recover the founding
generation's feel for the context that informs the meaning of
Article II. Perhaps these realities should at least give us pause
before concluding that Congress provoked a decisive resolution
of the removal question by enacting an open-ended "good
cause" provision in the independent counsel statute. 171 If
modern interpretive practice requires judges to hesitate before
inferring that Congress has entered a dangerous constitutional
thicket, the extraordinary debates surrounding the decision of
1789 may suggest that the removal question presents an
appropriate case for such hesitation.

171. Indeed, this premise may draw further support from the Morrison
Court's obvious reluctance to speak conclusively to the removal question. See
supra text accompanying note 75.

